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Abstract 
As many academics and some judges have openly admitted, no technique of 
statutory interpretation can settle every question of statutory ambiguity.  
Sometimes Congress enacts legislation containing gaps or inconsistencies that 
cannot be resolved through the application of a canon of construction or other 
interpretive rule.  This article proposes an alternative approach for these hard 
cases.  When a federal court is faced with a statute that leaves important issues 
about its application unclear – particularly issues that implicate the statute’s 
constitutionality – the court could stay the case and refer the question to 
Congress, much in the same way that courts now use abstention and certification 
to obtain answers about the meaning of state law from state courts.  If Congress 
chooses to clarify the ambiguity by amending the law in accordance with Article 
I’s bicameralism and presidential presentment requirements, then the court can 
apply the new law to the current case.  If Congress chooses not to act, the court 
is no worse off than before.  Indeed, congressional silence frees judges to be 
more creative in their responses to statutory ambiguity because they arguably 
have greater leeway to fill gaps or reconcile inconsistencies in an unclear 
statutory text that Congress has chosen not to clarify.  At the very least, judges 
insulate themselves from charges of judicial activism if they seek congressional 
input before attempting to interpret unclear statutes. 
The article begins by considering whether “certifying” questions to 
Congress would be constitutional, and then examines whether adoption of such a 
practice would be wise.  The discussion of both issues is informed by the fact that 
Congress regularly takes notice of judicial confusion and then acts to amend 
problem legislation, often explicitly stating an intention to affect the results in 
pending cases.  Considering that Congress is already assisting courts by 
clarifying statutory language at issue in pending cases – albeit in an informal 
and ad hoc way – this article concludes that it is worthwhile to formalize the 
process and encourage Congress to play an even greater role in resolving 
statutory ambiguity before an appellate court issues a definitive ruling. 
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CERTIFYING QUESTIONS TO CONGRESS 
Amanda Frost*
INTRODUCTION 
Congress frequently enacts legislation containing gaps or inconsistencies 
that cannot be resolved through techniques of statutory interpretation.1 The 
typical judicial reaction is to try to force meaning from the statute by applying 
some canon of construction or interpretive theory, even when the statute and its 
legislative history are silent or conflicted on the issue.2 Occasionally, judges will 
openly admit the impossibility of ascertaining legislative meaning and conclude 
their opinions by calling for Congress to clarify statutory language.3 Yet because 
they must resolve the cases before them, judges are still faced with the task of 
extracting meaning from an inscrutable statute.   
Legal scholars have engaged in a vibrant discourse about the best methods 
of resolving statutory ambiguity.  Much of the debate has focused on the two 
most widely accepted interpretive theories – textualism and intentionalism.4
Both schools incorporate the canons of construction, which have themselves been 
the subject of long debate.  More recently, proponents of dynamic statutory 
interpretation have moved beyond discussion of hermeneutics and have claimed 
that courts have the authority to update vague or open-ended statutes to 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.  B.A., 
Harvard College; J.D., Harvard Law School.  I wish to thank Elena Baylis, Richard 
Bierschbach, William Eskridge, Brandon Garrett, Robert Katzmann, Gregory Maggs, 
Martin Redish, Bonnie Robin-Vergeer, Stephanie Tai, Melissa Waters, David Zaring, the 
faculty at American University Washington College of Law, and the participants of the 
South Eastern Association of Law Schools Conference for helpful comments on drafts of 
this article. 
1 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (1987) (“The national legislature expresses itself too often in 
commands that are unclear, imprecise, or gap-ridden; in too many cases, as Chief Justice 
Rehnquist once wrote, ‘[t]he effort to determine congressional intent . . . might better be 
entrusted to a detective than to a judge.’”); Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking – 
Judges Who Can’t And Legislators Who Won’t, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 792-793 (1963) 
(“My criticism is directed rather at cases in which the legislature has said enough to 
deprive the judges of power to make law even in such subordinate respects but has given 
them guidance that is defective in one way or another, and then does nothing by way of 
remedy when the problem comes to light.”); Henry John Copeland Nagle, Corrections 
Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1280 & n. 43 (1996) (“[T]he courts complain of 
ambiguous statutory language daily.”).   
2 See, e.g. discussion infra Part I.B. 
3 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servcs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2624 (2005) 
(noting that 28 U.S.C. 1367 may contain an “unintentional drafting gap” but concluding 
that “[i]f that is the case, it is up to Congress rather than the courts to fix it”); Abdul-
Malik v. Hawk-Sawyer, 403 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that sentencing statutes raise 
separation of powers and federalism concerns and “invit[ing] congressional consideration 
of these statutes”); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990) (“If Congress 
erred, however, it is for that body, and not this Court, to correct its mistake.”); Gustafson 
v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 603-604 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“If adjustment 
[of the statute] is in order, as the Court’s opinion powerfully suggests it is, Congress is 
equipped to undertake the alteration.”) 
4 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419 
(2005) (describing the two dominant interpretive methodologies as being textualism and 
intentionalism). 
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acknowledge changed circumstances or to better accord with evolved social 
standards.5 The scholars in all these camps base their critiques of the status quo 
and proposals for change on their view of the role judges should play in the 
American system of government.6
This article proposes another solution to the problem of intractable statutory 
ambiguity – a solution that reflects a different normative view about the place of 
the judiciary in our constitutional structure.  When a federal court must construe 
a statute that leaves important issues about its application unclear, the court 
should have the option to stay the case and refer the question to Congress, much 
in the same way that courts now use abstention and certification to obtain 
answers about the meaning of state law from state courts.  Congress may then 
clarify the ambiguity by amending the law in accordance with Article I’s 
bicameralism and presidential presentment requirements, after which the court 
can (in fact, usually must) apply the new law to the pending case.7
Sending truly ambiguous statutes to Congress for clarification is the best use 
of courts’ and Congress’s institutional competences.  Federal judges, valued for 
their independence from politics and public opinion, have neither the expertise 
nor the authority to engage in the kind of substantive lawmaking that is required 
when they must apply a statute containing significant gaps or conflicting 
language.  The legislative branch, on the other hand, has the investigative 
capabilities and connections with the community to assist it in policymaking, and 
its members can be held accountable for their choices by the electorate.  
Furthermore, sending questions about statutory meaning to Congress is a more 
honest response to truly opaque statutes than attempts at interpretation; when 
courts use the canons of construction or theories of interpretation to find meaning 
where there is none, they undermine the legitimacy of these important 
interpretive tools.  Finally, sending questions to Congress provides Congress with 
an incentive to take immediate action to avoid a judicial decision that might 
establish new law and create new stakeholders, making a congressional override 
difficult.  At the very least, the process will alert Congress of the problems in 
legislative texts and hopefully inspire it to do a better job of drafting future 
legislation.8
When judges devote so much of their time and energy to ascertaining 
congressional intent and parsing meaning from indeterminate statutory language, 
 
5 See e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) [hereinafter, 
ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION], RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING 
LAW (1995); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 20 (1988); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002) [hereinafter Elhauge, Preference-Estimating]
6 As one scholar in this area has declared, “[i]n the end, the quest for statutory meaning 
in the absence of formal legislative evidence reduces to a debate over the proper role that 
courts should play in construing statutes . . .”  Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, 
and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV.1389, 1437 (2005)  
7 See discussion infra Parts II & III.  As discussed in more detail in Part III, there is some 
tension between the principle that courts must apply new law to pending cases and the 
presumption against retroactivity.  See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 264 
(1994).  However, if Congress is clear that it wishes the law to apply retroactively, and 
Congress has not transgressed the “modest” constitutional limitations on its power to do 
so, then the Court must apply the new law to pending cases.  Id. at 272.  
8 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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it is strange not to at least consider bringing the problem to the attention of the 
very political branches imbued with the authority to definitively resolve that 
ambiguity.  Yet courts have never referred ambiguous statutes to Congress for 
clarifying amendments and the academic literature contains only a very few 
passing references to the concept.9 The reluctance to entertain the idea may stem 
from a sense that courts should not be asking Congress to enact laws that resolve 
pending cases; the U.S. Constitution carefully separates the lawmaking and 
judicial functions, and those lines might be blurred if Congress is encouraged to 
craft legislation concerning a dispute in a case before a court.10 Even as courts 
and commentators have overlooked or rejected the possibility of referring 
ambiguous statutes to Congress, however, Congress has on many occasions taken 
note of judicial confusion about the meaning of legislation and stepped in to 
amend unclear statutory language.11 Considering that Congress is already 
assisting courts by clarifying legislation at issue in pending cases – albeit in an 
informal and ad hoc way – this article argues in favor of a formal certification 
process that would give the courts a role in selecting the cases in which 
Congressional assistance would be helpful.   
Part I.A of this article discusses the causes of statutory ambiguity, ranging 
from innocent drafting errors to deliberate legislative choices to leave language 
unclear, and describes the different schools of statutory interpretation that courts 
employ to resolve ambiguities.  Part I.B then illustrates the problems posed by 
truly opaque statutes by describing three Supreme Court cases from the October 
2004 term in which the Court struggled, unconvincingly, to resolve the meaning 
of unclear statutory language using these traditional methods of statutory 
interpretation.   
Part II proposes certifying questions to Congress as an alternative method of 
dealing with ambiguous statutes.  This Part draws a connection between judicial 
referrals to Congress and the theories supporting federal courts’ use of abstention 
and certification to provide an opportunity for state courts to decide difficult 
questions of state law.  Although there are important differences between the two 
types of abstention, sending questions to Congress can be justified by many of 
the same rationales that underlie certifying questions about the meaning of state 
law to state courts.  Part II concludes by describing Congress’s long history of 
taking notice of judicial confusion and acting to resolve statutory ambiguity – 
 
9 See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 
2162, 2180-81 (2002) [hereinafter Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting] (commenting that a 
“more straightforward approach” to the problem of statutory ambiguity might be to 
certify questions to Congress); Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory 
Ambiguity:  Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 123, 173 (1992) (suggesting at the end of an article on the costs of statutory 
ambiguity that federal courts might consider certifying questions of statutory meaning to 
Congress). 
10 See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares:  On Judges, Legislatures, 
and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1988) (“Traditionally, most academics and 
judges have viewed the legislative role as quite separate and distinct from the judicial 
role: judges are not to exercise directly legislative powers and legislators are not to 
mandate the outcome of particular cases or controversies pending before the federal 
courts.”); Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance?:  Steps for 
Legislatures and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1092 
(1991); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219-34 (1995). 
11 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
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sometimes on the eve of a circuit court or Supreme Court decision on the matter.  
In light of this well-established practice, it makes sense to develop a system by 
which courts can seek congressional assistance in cases of their choosing by 
certifying questions to Congress.   
Part III addresses the constitutional concerns raised by certifying questions 
to Congress, and describes the ways in which the process could be structured to 
avoid an impermissible intermingling of the functions of the legislative and 
judicial branches.   
Part IV engages in a normative analysis of the proposal:  Assuming that 
certifying questions to Congress can be structured so as to pass constitutional 
muster – as I argue it can be – would giving Congress an opportunity to weigh in 
on pending cases be wise?  Powerful arguments can be made that judicial 
referrals to Congress are a more democratic, as well as more honest, method of 
addressing statutory ambiguity than is the current system under which courts 
employ complex and conflicting canons and theories of statutory interpretation to 
arrive at a statutory meaning that no elected body enacted into law.  On the other 
hand, Congress may not be at its best when legislating in the shadow of pending 
cases, and transferring cases from the (relatively) apolitical judicial branch to the 
nakedly political legislative branch puts unpopular and unsophisticated litigants 
at a disadvantage.  To illustrate these points, this Part returns to the three cases 
discussed in Part I to describe how certification might have resolved the 
questions about statutory meaning raised in those cases. 
I conclude that certifying questions to Congress would be a valuable 
addition to the judicial arsenal, but that it should be used sparingly and with 
caution.  Certification is worthwhile when it would allow a court to avoid 
difficult constitutional questions or would give Congress and the President a role 
in deciding significant issues of policy best addressed in the first instance by the 
political branches.  On the other side of the spectrum, certification might also 
make sense in cases in which the statute contains a minor technical error that can 
be quickly and easily resolved through clarifying legislation.  Congress should 
not be consulted, however, when the litigants possess widely differing degrees of 
political influence or when Congress might be expected to act hastily to satisfy 
shifting and tyrannical majority preferences.  Admittedly, distinguishing these 
cases will not always be easy, but I argue that it is a more honest exercise than 
one in which the courts seek to glean meaning from a statute that contains none. 
The article concludes by discussing the significance of congressional 
inaction.  If a court certified a question to Congress that Congress chose not to 
answer – as would likely often occur – I contend that Congress’s silence would 
serve as an implicit delegation of legislative power to the courts.  Judges could 
then engage in more freewheeling and creative reading of legislation than would 
be justified had Congress not first turned down the opportunity to clarify 
ambiguous statutory language.  Moreover, simply by referring questions to 
Congress, judges will have bought themselves some political cover against 
charges of judicial activism for filling gaps and reconciling inconsistencies in 
ambiguous statutes.  
I. THE PROBLEM OF STATUTORY INDETERMINACY 
 To evaluate whether certifying questions to Congress is a useful method of 
resolving statutory ambiguity, we must first understand why Congress drafts 
ambiguous statutes and how courts currently deal with that problem.  Part I.A 
addresses the causes of statutory indeterminacy and the interpretive methods 
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courts employ in response.  As any student of the law knows, this is an area of 
extensive discussion among not just scholars, but practitioners and judges as 
well.  The summary below is not meant to be comprehensive or to address the 
nuances of the problems of statutory drafting and interpretation – those topics 
could each take up an entire law review article by themselves.  Rather, my goal 
here is to outline a debate that has been richly explored in other sources to 
remind the reader of the issues faced by courts in this area before turning to my 
proposal to send at least some of these hard cases of statutory construction back 
to Congress for consideration.   
 Part I.B then looks closely at three decisions from the Supreme Court’s 2004 
term to observe these methods of interpretation at work, and to illustrate how 
frequently they fail to locate meaning in truly ambiguous legislative text. 
 
A. The Judicial Response to Statutory Ambiguity. 
 Statutes are ambiguous for a variety of reasons.  Sometimes the rush to 
enact a needed piece of legislation will result in sloppy or inconsistent language 
or even outright drafting errors.12 Sometimes Congress will rationally conclude 
that it is not worth its time to attempt to predict and address every potential 
wrinkle in a statute’s implementation.13 And sometimes the ambiguity arises 
from application of the law to a new or unusual circumstance that Congress could 
not foresee.14 Less benignly, Congress may choose to enact an ambiguous statute 
as a compromise to ensure the statute’s passage; by being purposely vague, 
legislative drafters can generate sufficient support for a statute that would fail to 
become law were sensitive issues definitively resolved through clear and detailed 
statutory language.15 
12 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
57, 83 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 405, 433 (1989) [hereinafter “Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes”]. 
13 Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes With Multiple Personality Disorders:  
The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 
640 (2002). 
14 Calabresi, supra note __; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the 
Classroom and In the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983) [herinafter Posner, 
Statutory Interpretation]; see also ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 61 
(1997) (discussing the different reasons for statutory ambiguity) [hereinafter KATZMANN,
COURTS AND CONGRESS].  As Judge Posner wrote: 
[The] basic reason why statutes are so frequently ambiguous in application is 
not that they are poorly drafted – though many are – and not that the 
legislators failed to agree on just what they wanted to accomplish in the statute 
– though often they do fail – but that a statute necessarily is drafted in advance 
of, and with imperfect appreciation for the problems that will be encountered 
in, its application. 
Posner, supra note __, at 811. 
15 See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 2, 20-22 (1997) (“Some compromises . 
. . result in clear statutory language purposely being made unclear.”); Victoria F. Nourse 
& Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting:  A Congressional Case Study, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 594 (2002) (noting that legislation often contains “deliberate 
ambiguity”); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 261 (1994) (“It is entirely 
possible – indeed, highly probably – that, because it was unable to resolve the 
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Whatever the causes, courts have to deal with the problem of applying 
unclear statutes.  Interpreting ambiguous statutes has been the focus of an 
extraordinary amount of academic discussion16 and judicial debate.17 Although 
“theories of statutory interpretation have blossomed like dandelions in the 
spring,”18 two dominate the field:  textualism and intentionalism.19 Most jurists 
also turn to various canons of statutory interpretation to help them construe 
opaque statutes.  Dynamic statutory interpretation is a relatively new approach 
that few jurists would claim to have adopted, but which some scholars forward as 
a descriptively accurate account of how judges deal with indeterminate statutes.20 
Below is a thumbnail sketch of these approaches, followed by a summary of the 
debate about their effectiveness in locating the meaning in an ambiguously 
worded text. 
 1. Textualism 
Textualism is an interpretive theory that seeks to find meaning in the 
language of the statute as it would have been understood by an observer at the 
time of its passage.21 Textualists look only for the objective understanding of the 
statute’s language, and thus have no interest in trying to ascertain the intent of the 
enacting Congress.22 Indeed, textualists contend that there is no such thing as 
congressional “intent” because a multimember body such as Congress cannot 
have one unified understanding of the law being enacted.23 Accordingly, 
textualists strictly limit the sources they rely on to assist them in interpreting 
unclear statutory language:  a contemporaneous dictionary definition of a 
 
retroactivity issue . . . Congress viewed the matter as an open issue to be resolved by the 
courts.”).   
16 See, e.g., Maggs, supra note __, at 136 (“Modern legal scholarship has perhaps dealt 
with no single subject more thoroughly than statutory interpretation.”); Sunstein, 
Interpreting Statutes, supra note __; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 
Statutory Interpretation and Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); 
Rosenkranz, supra note __, at 2086 (“For as long as there have been statutes, lawyers and 
laymen have puzzled over their inevitable ambiguities.”); Elhauge, Preference-
Estimating, supra note __, at 2029. 
17 Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“By 
far the greatest part of what I and all federal judges do is to interpret the meaning of 
federal statutes and federal agency regulations.  Thus the subject of statutory 
interpretation deserves study and attention in its own right, as the principal business of 
judges and (hence) lawyers.”). 
18 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note __, at 1.  For an 
overview of schools of thought regarding statutory interpretation, see KATZMANN,
COURTS AND CONGRESS, supra note __, at 46-64 (discussing canons of statutory 
construction, public interest theory, public choice theory, positive political theory, 
textualist theory, and contextualism). 
19 See supra note __. 
20 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note __, at 9-106.  
21 A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW vii (Amy Gutmann 
ed., 1997). 
22 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note __, at 17 (“We look for a sort of “objectified” intent – the 
intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law. . . .”).  But see, 
Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005) (disputing the notion that 
textualists are focused entirely on objective meaning rather than Congress’s subjective 
intent).    
23 Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note __, at 433. 
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statutory term is useful, but committee reports and floor statements are not.  
Textualism has gained prominence as its leading proponents, Justices Scalia and 
Thomas on the Supreme Court and Judge Easterbrook on the Seventh Circuit, 
have risen in the ranks of the federal judiciary.  
Proponents consider textualism to be the theory of interpretation most 
consistent with democratic values.  As Justice Scalia has explained, textualists 
focus on the language of the statute and the objective understanding of that 
language because “it is simply incompatible with democratic government, or 
indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by 
what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.”24 
Government by unexpressed legislative intent is “tyrannical” because it is the law 
that should govern, and not the intent of the lawgiver.25 Furthermore, textualists 
view intentionalism as a cover for judges to slip their own policy preferences into 
statutory interpretation.26 Judges should not enact legislators’ unexpressed intent 
into law, but even more so judges should not enact their own policy preferences 
into law.     
Critics of textualism point out that it is a terribly thin method of gleaning 
statutory meaning, and they believe that textualists simply ignore the fact that the 
statutory language alone does not always provide the answers.27 They contend 
that certain judges have “begun to use textualist methods of construction that 
routinely allow them to attribute ‘plain meaning’ to statutory language that most 
observers would characterize as ambiguous or internally inconsistent.”28 
Mirroring textualists’ critiques of intentionalism, opponents charge that 
textualists insert their conservative policy preference into statutes under cover of 
“plain language” analysis.29 In sum, textualists’ critics think it lacks the 
sophistication needed to find meaning in unclear statutes, and they dispute the 
textualists’ assertion that it provides a neutral and value-free method of statutory 
interpretation. 
2. Intentionalism 
Intentionalists construe statutes in an effort to realize the enacting 
legislatures’ intent.30 Accordingly, intentionalists will rely on legislative history 
and floor debates, and they are willing to construe statutory text in light of the 
purpose for which the law was enacted.  Like textualists, intentionalists also 
claim that their enterprise is consistent with democratic values because they are 
enforcing the commands of elected representatives; it is just that intentionalists 
 
24 Scalia, supra note __, at 17. 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., id at 17-18.  
27 Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in this Class?”  The Conflict 
Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 656-57 (2005) 
(“[A] leading criticism of textualism” is that “in too many situations, the statutory text 
just does not provide enough guidance.”) 
28 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism:  An Invitation to 
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752 
(1995). 
29 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Forward:  Law as Equilibrium, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 26, 77 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Forward]. 
30 See John J. Gibbons, Intentionalism, History, and Legitimacy, 75 TEX. L. REV. 435, 
465-66 (1996).     
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view courts as agents of the legislature, while textualists want courts to serve as 
agents of the statute itself.31
Intentionalism, like textualism, cannot rid statutes of all ambiguity.  The 
legislature may not have anticipated every situation in which the statute comes 
into play, and thus there will be no legislative purpose to guide the court in its 
application of the statute in unforeseen circumstances.  And it does not always 
make sense to discuss the “intent” of a multimember institution like a legislature, 
which may have many different and sometimes conflicting purposes in mind 
when enacting a statute.32 As public choice theorists have pointed out, if the 
statute is a jumble of trade-offs among interest groups, then it is impossible to 
extrapolate from some nonexistent consensus about the statute’s end goals to fill 
gaps or reconcile inconsistencies.33 In such cases, there is no “spirit” to be 
attributed to the legislation, but rather a legislative middle ground in which each 
side got some, but not all, of what it wanted.  To interpret the law in light of 
some greater purpose would then undermine the compromise that allowed the 
legislation to be enacted into law in the first place.34 In short, critics contend that 
the very idea of a discoverable legislative intent or statutory spirit is a chimera 
that often serves as a cover for judicial lawmaking.  
3.  Canons of Construction 
Another method of resolving statutory ambiguity is to employ canons of 
construction that set default rules to assist in interpretation.  Some canons are 
valued simply as common-sense guides to the reading of any text – for example, 
the canon that specific statutory provisions qualify general ones or that words in 
a statute should not be rendered superfluous.35 Some canons incorporate 
presumptions about how the legislative process works – for example, repeals by 
implication are disfavored, and appropriations statutes are presumed not to 
modify substantive law.36 More generally, canons are valued as providing a set 
of default rules against which Congress legislates, so that courts are simply 
applying the same tools to interpret that Congress used in drafting.37 In addition 
to incorporating these values into the process of statutory construction, canons 
are praised as a method of limiting judicial discretion because they require judges 
to rely on something other than their own policy preferences when interpreting 
unclear statutes. 
Yet the claimed benefits of the canons of statutory construction have been 
repeatedly challenged.  As Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey rather 
bluntly put it: “almost everybody thinks that canons are bunk.”38 Judge Richard 
 
31 Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note __, at 415. 
32 Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note __, at 433. 
33 Nelson, supra note __, at 370-71. 
34 Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note __, at 427 (“The characterization of 
legislative purpose is an act of creation rather than discovery.”). 
35 See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992); Jett v. 
Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2722 (1989). 
36 United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980).    
37 Eskridge & Frickey, Forward, supra note __, at 27 (“The usefulness of the canons . . . 
does not depend upon the Court’s choosing the ‘best’ canons for each proposition.  
Instead, the canons may be understood as conventions, similar to driving a car on the 
right-hand side of the road; often it is not as important to choose the best convention as it 
is to choose one convention, and stick to it.”). 
38 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION 630 (1988). 
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Posner has questioned the logic of many of the canons and argued that they do 
not, in fact, embody common-sense interpretive rules.39 Some of the 
assumptions about how the legislative process works are overly idealistic and 
inaccurate.  As Posner noted, why should repeals by implication be disfavored 
when there is no evidence that Congress “combs the United States Code for 
possible inconsistencies with the new statute, and when it spots one, it repeals the 
inconsistency explicitly”?40 And why should words in a statute never be read to 
create a redundancy when we know that Congress can be sloppy when drafting 
statutory language?41 Most vociferously refuted is the idea that canons prevent 
judges from enacting their policy preferences.  Professor Karl Llewellyn 
famously demonstrated that for every canon one could find an opposing canon, 
allowing judges to justify any result by citing to some purportedly neutral canon 
of statutory construction.42
The canon of constitutional avoidance has been the subject of particularly 
close scrutiny.  The benefits of the canon are oft-cited by courts – it enables the 
judiciary to resolve cases without having to expound on constitutional meaning 
or risk the direct conflict with Congress that would occur were the court to strike 
down legislation as unconstitutional.43 Yet commentators have questioned 
judicial authority to construe statutes to avoid potential constitutional issues – at 
least without first determining with certainty that the most straightforward 
reading of the statute would be constitutionally problematic.  Critics contend that 
when courts skew the reading of statutes to avoid even having to consider hard 
constitutional questions, they are essentially making a legislative, not a judicial, 
choice.44 
4.  Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 
Eskridge, one of the leading proponents of dynamic theories of statutory 
interpretation, has argued that courts should, and in fact already do, construe 
statutes “dynamically,” by which he means “in light of their present societal, 
political and legal context.”45 Eskridge has mustered evidence to show that 
courts seem to take into account signals of current congressional preferences, 
perhaps to avoid the potential for a congressional override of a judicial decision 
about statutory meaning that Congress does not like.46 Eskridge is joined by 
many other commentators who advocate incorporating public opinion and current 
 
39 Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note __, at 805. 
40 Id. at 812. 
41 Id. 
42 K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960); Posner, Statutory 
Interpretation, supra note __, at 817 (“Vacuous and inconsistent as they mostly are, the 
canons do not constrain judicial decision making but they do enable a judge to create the 
appearance that his decisions are constrained.”).  But see Scalia, supra note __, at 26-27.   
43 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1946). 
44 See, e.g., See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in 
Judicial Activism?, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1401, 1405 (2002) (criticizing the avoidance 
canon as “a roving commission to rewrite statutes to taste”); Frederick Schauer, 
Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 98 (1995). 
45 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 
1479 (1987). 
46 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding]. 
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social norms into statutory interpretation.47 Guido Calabresi has gone a step 
further and called for courts to “update” statutes in the same ways that courts 
adjust and amend the common law to take into account changing times.48 
Dynamic statutory interpretation theory also has its critics.  From an 
institutional competence perspective, it is argued that judges are not well-situated 
to determine current societal preferences because they lack the ties to 
constituents and the investigative capabilities that legislatures can use to gauge 
public opinions.49 Furthermore, when judges update statutory meaning to accord 
with current views of the public good, they usurp legislative power and expand 
their own role in government far beyond what the Constitution intended.  The 
very vagueness of the task will lead judges to insert their own policy preferences 
into the statutory text because they cannot locate public opinion.   
Seeking to address these concerns, Professor Einer Elhauge has recently 
published a series of articles suggesting that when judges are faced with statutory 
indeterminacy they should look to evidence of what the current Congress would 
do, rather than amorphous “societal preferences” on which other dynamic 
theorists would have courts rely.50 Although Elhauge’s proposal has the benefit 
of narrowing the sources to which a court can look to update statutes,51 there will 
likely be little or no evidence of what a current legislature thinks of a statute 
enacted decades ago.  If a court is truly unable to determine current legislative 
preferences, Elhauge proposes that the court adopt a construction of the statute 
designed to elicit a congressional response – his goal being to replace 
indeterminate statutory language with that approved by a majority of the current 
Congress.52 
In turn, Elhauge’s proposal has been criticized by Professor Amanda Tyler 
on the ground that it “erodes core separation of powers principles” by asking 
judges to “divin[e]” current legislative preferences before they become law.53 
She rejects his presumption that courts can issue opinions that will provoke 
legislatures into enacting legislation to override them, and, even if they could, 
pursuing this goal would be an evasion of judicial interpretive responsibilities 
and a usurpation of legislative power.54 This debate, as Tyler recognizes, turns 
on one’s views regarding the role of the judge:  Tyler values judges as 
“‘guardians’” of “‘continuity and predictability’” in statutory interpretation; she 
is concerned that dynamic theories of statutory interpretation value the judge’s 
creative role too highly, and at the expense of the judge’s role in providing 
legislative stability.55 
B. The Limits of Interpretation 
 
47 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 313-54 (1986); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes,
supra note __, at 451. 
48 CALBRESI, supra note __.   
49 See Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 
27, 60 (2003) (“Judges are relatively poorly equipped to identify social problems or 
undertake their own factual investigations into those problems.”); JAMES M. LANDIS, THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 31-36 (1938). 
50 Elhauge, Preference-Estimating, supra note __.  
51 Id. at 2030-31. 
52 Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting, supra note __, at 2165. 
53 Tyler, supra note __, at 1392. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1389-90 (quoting ROBERT F. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE 11 (1969) 
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As many academics and some judges have openly admitted, no technique of 
interpretation can resolve every question of statutory ambiguity.56 Posner 
acknowledged the problem when he asked: “[W]hat if a judge’s scrupulous 
search for the legislative will turns up nothing?  There are of course such cases, 
and they have to be decided some way.”57 Each term, the Supreme Court 
grapples with questions about statutory meaning that have divided the courts of 
appeals because there is no meaning that can be extracted from the legislative 
text or history.  Such cases demonstrate the limits of traditional methods of 
statutory interpretation and, consequently, the need to find alternative ways to 
ascertain the meaning of ambiguous statutes.   
To illustrate the problem, three cases from this past term are described 
below.  Each case presents what I believe is an intractable statutory construction 
problem; that is, an interpretive problem that cannot be resolved by any 
hermeneutic technique.  Yet in each case, the majority and dissent both claimed 
to find meaning in the statute by employing textualism, intentionalism, a canon 
of statutory construction, or some combination of the three.  Nor did any of the 
cases raise a question on which there was a clear societal or congressional 
preference that could have guided the Court. 
1. Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education 
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education58 raised the question whether 
the private right of action in Title IX extends to a claim by the male coach of a 
girls basketball team that he had been retaliated against for complaining that the 
team was not receiving equal funding and access to athletic equipment and 
facilities.  Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”59 The Court framed the issue as being whether 
“retaliation is discrimination ‘on the basis of sex,’” and thus is a cause of action 
that can be brought under Title IX.60 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit had dismissed the retaliation claim on the ground that “[n]othing in the 
text indicates any congressional concern with retaliation that might be visited on 
those who complain of Title IX violations.”61 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the conflict between the circuits on that point.62 
The Supreme Court was closely divided on the question, with the five 
justices in the majority holding that the language of Title IX included retaliation 
claims and the four dissenters concluding that it did not.  Although the majority 
 
56 See, e.g., Elhauge, Preference-Estimating, supra note __, at 2029 (“Statutory 
interpretation involves two crucial issues.  (1) How should courts divine the meaning of 
statutes?  (2) How should courts decide what to do when they cannot divine a statute’s 
meaning?”). 
57 Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note __, at 821.  Posner advocates that in such 
cases the judge can permissibly rely on considerations unrelated to legislative purpose, 
such as judicial administrability or “considerations drawn from some broadly based 
conception of the public interest.” 
58 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005). 
59 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
60 Id. at 1504. 
61 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1344 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
62 125 S. Ct. at 1503 (citing to the conflicting decisions in Lowrey v. Texas A & M Univ. 
System, 117 F.3d 242, 252 (5th Cir. 1997) and Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River 
Community College, 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
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acknowledged that other civil rights statutes specifically refer to retaliation 
claims, it concluded that this omission from Title IX was insignificant in light of 
the fact that Title IX is broadly written:  “Because Congress did not list any 
specific discriminatory practices when it wrote Title IX,” the majority reasoned, 
“its failure to mention one such practice does not tell us anything about whether 
it intended that practice to be covered.”63 Further support for this interpretation 
came from Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,64 a Supreme Court case decided 
three years before Title IX was enacted that held that a general prohibition on 
racial discrimination covered retaliation against those seeking to protect the 
rights of people directly covered by the statute.  The majority stated, “’it is not 
only appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly 
familiar with [Sullivan] and that it expected its enactment [of Title IX] to be 
interpreted in conformity with [Sullivan].’”65 Furthermore, the majority 
concluded that “[r]eporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX 
enforcement and would be discouraged if retaliation against those who report 
went unpunished.”66 Thus, the majority’s argument relied on all the traditional 
“intentionalist” methods of statutory construction – such as reliance on the text’s 
broad language, the context of the statute’s enactment, and the statutory purpose 
– to conclude that Congress intended to cover retaliation. 
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s analysis, flatly declaring that “the 
natural meaning of the phrase ‘on the basis of sex’ is on the basis of the 
plaintiff’s sex, not the sex of some other person.”67 The dissent then relied on a 
number of equally well-accepted tools of statutory interpretation to bolster its 
interpretation of the text.  For example, the dissenters pointed to canons of 
construction requiring Congress to speak clearly when imposing liability on 
states through the spending power, and the presumption against implying a cause 
of action when Congress has not made such a remedy clear.68 Because these 
canons counseled against finding a cause of action for retaliation, and because 
the dissenters found the text unclear at best, they could not agree that Title IX 
allowed claims for retaliation. 
 In the final analysis, Jackson presented a question of statutory construction 
for which there was no clear answer.  Whether a private cause of action could be 
brought for retaliation divided the Supreme Court five to four and the circuit 
courts two to one.  Each side could muster arguments based on theories of 
interpretation and canons of construction, but ultimately none could provide a 
satisfying response to the question whether the statute allowed claims for 
retaliation. 
Jackson was also a case with clear ideological battle lines:  liberals favor the 
conclusion that there is a cause of action for retaliation, while conservatives do 
not.  Four of the five justices in the majority – Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and 
Stevens – are commonly perceived to be the relatively liberal members of the 
Court, while three of the four dissenters – Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist – are 
considered the Court’s staunchest conservatives.  Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy played their usual swing vote role, with O’Connor’s decision to join the 
 
63 Id. at 1505. 
64 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
65 Id. at 1506 (quoting Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979)). 
66 Id. at 1508. 
67 Id. at 1511. 
68 Id. at 1514. 
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liberals giving them the majority.  Unsurprisingly, the decision was criticized as 
an activist decision by liberal judges willing to ignore statutory text in favor of 
their policy preferences.69 
2. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United 
States ex rel. Wilson 
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. Wilson70 required the 
Court to address a rather mundane question about the statute of limitations period 
for retaliation claims under the False Claims Act (FCA).  In a provision codified 
at 31 U.S.C. 3729(a), the FCA prohibits making false or fraudulent claims for 
compensation from the United States.  Section 3730(b)(1) permits private 
individual to bring actions for violations in the government’s name.  In its 1986 
amendments to the Act, Congress added section 3730(h), which established a 
private cause of action for an individual retaliated against by his employer for 
assisting an FCA investigation.  At issue in Graham County was the section 
establishing the statute of limitations, 3731(b)(1), which provides that “[a] civil 
action under section 3730 may not be brought (1) more than six years after the 
date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed.”  All agreed that 
section 3731(b)(1) establishes a six-year statute of limitations for claims 
regarding the making of a false claim.  The question to be resolved by the Court 
was whether that six-year limitations period also applies to retaliation claims 
brought under section 3730(h).  A panel of the Fourth Circuit split on that issue,71 
and the courts of appeals were divided as well.72 
By a vote of 7-2, the Court held that section 3731(b)(1)’s limitations period 
did not apply to retaliation claims.  Even though section 3731(b)(1) sets a six 
year statute of limitations for any “civil action under section 3730,” and even 
though retaliation is  a “civil action under section 3730,” the majority concluded 
that the statute was “ambiguous” as to whether the limitations period applies to 
retaliation claims.73 The majority again took the intentionalist approach, citing 
the principle that statutory language has to be “read in its proper context,”74 and 
noting that other provisions of the statute relating to the limitations period were 
inconsistent with the conclusion that it applied to retaliation claims.75 For 
example, the statute of limitations begins to run “on the date on which the 
violation of section 3729 is committed” – that is, the date on which a defendant 
submitted a false claim.  That start date makes no sense for retaliation claims, 
which do not require the plaintiff to allege that a false claim was made.  
 
69 Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principles and the Judicial Role in Statutory 
Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 373 n.180 (2005) (describing Jackson as a decision 
that “mistakenly departs from statutory text in order to achieve what the Court regarded 
as a desirable policy outcome”). 
70 125 S. Ct. 2444 (2005). 
71 United States ex rel. Wilson v. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 367 
F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2004). 
72 125 S. Ct. at 2448 (citing Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 865-866 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that FCA’s 6-year statute of limitation applies to retaliation claims) and Lujan v. 
Hughes Aircraft Co., 162 F.3d 1027, 1034-1035 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that FCA’s 
limitation period does not apply to retaliation claims)).  
73 Id. at 2449. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
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Moreover, this anomaly could lead to the expiration of the statute of limitations 
for retaliation claims before the retaliatory behavior began.76
After concluding that the statutory language was unclear when read in 
context, the majority then applied the “default rule that Congress generally drafts 
statutes of limitations to begin when the cause of action accrues.”77 That “rule of 
construction” led the majority to the conclusion that the six-year statute of 
limitation in section 3731(b)(1) did not apply to retaliation claims.78 The 
majority was still left with the problem of finding a statute of limitations for 
retaliation claims.  Following its long practice when Congress fails to set a 
limitations period, the court held that the most closely analogous state statute of 
limitations should apply to retaliation claims under the FCA.79 
In dissent, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg made a textualist argument.  In 
their view, Congress had written a “reasonably clear” statute.  The six year 
statute of limitations in section 3731(b)(1) applies to any “civil action under 
section 3730,” which includes retaliation claims.  Although the dissenters agreed 
that it is “unusual” for Congress to set the statute of limitations running before 
the injury occurs, they found nothing to prevent Congress from taking this 
course.  They concluded that “Congress has written such a statute here, and the 
Court should respect its decision.”80 
Graham County raised a very close question of statutory interpretation that 
seems to have no definitive answer.  The plain text favors the dissenters’ reading, 
but there is the oddity that a false claim appears to serve as the triggering event to 
start the limitations period running on the retaliation claim, suggesting either that 
the trigger event itself was a drafting error, or that Congress did not intend for the 
six year statute of limitations period to apply to retaliation claims.  Congress was 
unclear, and neither the default rules of construction employed by the majority 
nor the plain language arguments made by the dissent are satisfying 
interpretations of the statute as it is written.  One is left with the distinct suspicion 
that Congress simply never gave this issue any thought.    
3.  Clark v. Martinez  
Clark v. Martinez81 required the Court to address for a second time 
ambiguous wording in the Immigration and Nationality Act regarding detention 
of aliens ordered removed from the United States.  The provision at issue, 8 
U.S.C. 1231(a)(6), provides that “[a]n alien ordered removed . . . may be 
detained beyond the removal period.”  This provision applies to several 
categories of aliens, including: 1) inadmissible aliens ordered removed; and 2) 
aliens who were originally admitted to the United States and later ordered 
removed.  The question in Zadvydas v. Davis,82 decided in 2001, was whether 
section 1231(a)(6) permitted indefinite detention of aliens in the second category, 
while the question before the Court in Clark concerned the permissible length of 
detention for aliens who fell into the first category because they were never 
legally admitted to the United States.   
 
76 Id. at 2452. 
77 Id. at 2450. 
78 Id. at 2452-53. 
79 Id. at 2453. 
80 Id. at 2453.  Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. 
81 125 S. Ct. 716 (2005). 
82 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
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Zadvydas concerned two aliens admitted to the United States but then 
subsequently ordered removed.  No country would accept them, however, and as 
a result the aliens were kept in detention by the government for years with no 
reasonably foreseeable chance of being deported.  The aliens argued that the 
statute did not permit their indefinite detention by immigration authorities, while 
the government contended that “the statute means what it literally says”:  “It sets 
no ‘limit on the length of time . . . that an alien . . . may be detained.’”83 By a 
vote of 5 to 4, the Court disagreed, holding that the statute did not permit 
indefinite detention but rather allowed detention “only as long as ‘reasonably 
necessary’ to remove [an alien] from the country.”84 
The Court explained that the statute’s use of the word “may” in the 
provision stating that aliens “may be detained beyond the removal period” 
“suggests discretion” regarding the length of detention, but “not necessarily . . . 
unlimited discretion.  In that respect, the word ‘may’ is ambiguous.”85 Because 
the indefinite detention of aliens who had been admitted to the country, like 
Zadvydas, raised serious constitutional concerns, the Court interpreted the statute 
to permit only detention necessary to accomplish removal; “once removal is no 
longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized.”86 
The Court further held that “the presumptive period during which the detention 
of an alien is reasonably necessary to effectuate his removal is six months; after 
that, the alien is eligible for conditional release if he can demonstrate that there is 
‘no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’”87 In 
sum, the Court concluded that the statutory language was unclear as to the 
amount of time aliens could be detained, and it applied the canon of 
constitutional avoidance to limit that period. 
The question in Clark v. Martinez was whether Zadvydas’s interpretation of 
section 1231(a)(6) also applies to the first category of aliens – that is, those 
ordered removed who were never admitted to the United States.  The Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits had split on this issue.  Seven Justices concluded that it must 
give the provision the same meaning as they did in Zadvydas. The two 
dissenters, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that the 
presumptive six-month limit imposed by the Court in Zadvydas rested largely on 
an interpretation of the language required by the canon of constitutional doubt – a 
canon that was not applicable in the case of an alien who had never been legally 
admitted to the United States and whose detention could thus not implicate the 
same pressing constitutional questions.88 The majority responded that this 
reasoning “cannot justify giving the same detention provision a different meaning 
when [a different categories of] aliens are involved.”  The ambiguity in the 
statutory language, coupled with the constitutional concerns raised by its 
application to at least one category of aliens, required that the Court graft a 
presumptive six-month limit into the detention provision.   
 
83 533 U.S. at 689 (quoting from Brief for Petitioners in No. 00-38, p. 22). 
84 125 S. Ct. at 722. 
85 Id. 
86 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. 
87 Clark, 125 S. Ct. at 722. 
88 Id. at 723-724; see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (“It is well established that certain 
constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to 
aliens outside of our geographic boundaries.”) 
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Zadvydas and Clark are classic constitutional avoidance cases.  The 
statutory language was not perfectly clear and the result of one reading was 
constitutionally suspect, so the Court applied the canon to avoid addressing 
whether the constitution would permit indefinite detention of an alien.  Applying 
that canon further required that the Court invent an amount of time that the aliens 
could be detained.  The Court concluded that six months was a reasonable period, 
after which the government had to either demonstrate a foreseeable chance of 
removal or release the aliens.  As is obvious from reading the statute and the 
opinions, that six month period was entirely the creation of a Court struggling to 
avoid striking down an ambiguous statute as unconstitutional.   
Conclusion 
The three cases discussed above all involved questions about the meaning of 
unclear statutes that divided the circuit courts and the Supreme Court justices.  
As these three cases illustrate, no theory of interpretation or canon of 
construction can help courts resolve truly inscrutable statutes.  Congress appears 
to have left open the question whether Title IX creates a cause of action for 
retaliation, whether the six-year statute of limitations in the False Claims Act 
applies to retaliation claims, and the length of time that aliens can be detained 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act.    
Absent congressional assistance, courts have no choice but to plow ahead 
and do their best to resolve cases in as principled a manner as possible.  In some 
of these cases, however, the courts might be wiser to abstain from searching for 
meaning where there plainly is none, and instead ask Congress to step in and 
clarify ambiguous or poorly written text.  Considering that Congress created the 
problem, and that Congress is capable of undoing any judicial decision about the 
meaning of statutory text, it follows that Congress is the institution best-situated 
to resolve disagreements about the meaning of statutes.  Just as important, the 
judiciary will have gained even if Congress does not respond to its query.  If the 
language of a statute is unclear, and if Congress chooses not to assist a court by 
clarifying its meaning after a court requests it to do so, then courts are 
empowered by that congressional silence to make law to replace the ambiguous 
text before it.89 
II. The Proposal:  Certifying Questions of Statutory Ambiguity to 
Congress. 
 A. The Proposal 
 Although the techniques of statutory interpretation described in Part I.A 
continue to be used widely by judges, they are criticized as providing cover for 
judicial overreaching, and none can identify the meaning of truly ambiguous 
statutes, as was illustrated in Part I.B.  This article proposes that courts consider 
an alternative method of dealing with at least some types of statutory ambiguity:  
Courts should have the option of referring questions about statutory meaning to 
Congress, much the same way courts now certify questions about the meaning of 
ambiguous state law to state courts.   
Certification of questions to Congress would work as follows:  When a court 
concludes that a statute it is asked to address is unclear, it could choose to stay 
the case, refer the problem to Congress, and await a response that would apply to 
the pending case.  If no response was forthcoming within a reasonable period of 
time, the court could then go ahead and decide the case with the newfound 
 
89 See infra notes __ - __. 
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freedom arising from Congress’s implicit delegation of the legislative task of 
filling gaps or reconciling inconsistencies in the statute’s text.  For example, had 
certification been available last term, the Court could have granted certiorari in 
Jackson, Graham County, and Clark, and then referred its questions about the 
meaning of the statutes in those three cases to Congress.  If Congress had not 
taken up the question, the Court could have decided the cases on its own; if 
Congress did respond by amending the statute at issue to clarify its meaning, the 
Court could then remand the case and allow the lower court to apply the amended 
statute in the first instance.90 
Although a few scholars have briefly raised the possibility of certifying 
questions to Congress, there has been no detailed discussion in the academic 
literature about whether such a process would be constitutional or useful to the 
courts.91 Several prominent judges have supported the different, but not entirely 
unrelated, idea of establishing committees that would focus on identifying and 
revising problem legislation.  Justice Benjamin Cardozo recommended the 
creation of a Ministry of Justice composed of law professors, judges, and 
practitioners to perform that task.92 Judge Henry Friendly revived Cardozo’s 
idea in 1963, though he thought the committee should be located in the 
legislative rather than the executive branch.93 Further elaborating on these 
proposals, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggested the creation of a “second 
look at laws” congressional committee that would engage in “statutory 
housekeeping” by fixing grammatical problems and ambiguous language 
identified by courts.94 None of these proposals were ever acted upon, however, 
most likely because they required adding a layer of bureaucracy to an already 
over-burdened system.  Moreover, these committee-based proposals address 
problems only after a court has been forced to issue a decision regarding the 
meaning of the statute – setting in stone an interpretation that would be difficult 
for Congress to undo.  Nor do these committees give Congress the same 
incentive to take action that it would have were a court to abstain for a set period 
while awaiting Congress’s response to a referral.   
Permitting courts to certify questions to Congress thus has significant 
advantages over a roving committee, but also raises separation of powers 
concerns that the committee-based solutions avoid.  Part III analyzes the ways in 
which a certification process must be structured to avoid overstepping 
constitutional boundaries.  Part IV addresses how and when certification should 
be used:  that is, which courts should have the power to certify questions to 
Congress, which type of questions they should refer, and how they should deal 
with a congressional response (or non-response).  Before delving into the nuts 
 
90 The proposal discussed here is limited to federal courts and Congress.  Conceivably, 
federal courts could certify questions about state law to state legislatures, and state courts 
could certify questions about federal law to Congress.  Because federal courts already 
have the option to certify questions about state law to state courts, there is a less pressing 
need for federal courts to obtain legislative assistance with the interpretation of state law.  
Allowing state courts to certify questions to Congress would be problematic because it 
would significantly the number of courts seeking Congress’s attention and possibly 
disrupting its legislative agenda – a problem addressed in Part IV.  See infra notes __ to 
__.    
91 See supra note __. 
92 Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 114 (1921). 
93 Friendly, supra note __. 
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and bolts of how certifying questions to Congress would work in practice, 
however, this Part describes how the federal courts have long accepted, and even 
welcomed, the involvement of other institutions in decisionmaking.  In light of 
this history, certification to Congress can be understood as an extension of 
current practice rather than as a radical new concept. 
B. Drawing on the Tradition of Certification to State Courts. 
The idea of certifying questions to Congress might at first seem anomalous.  
Courts are supposed to decide the questions that come before them, not abstain 
and await a decision on the matter from another branch of government.  And yet 
the concept has a pre-existing analogue in the certification and abstention 
procedures regularly used by federal courts to obtain state court clarification of 
state law.  Although certifying questions to state courts is relatively new, “the use 
of certification is on the rise.”95 For the most part, federal and state courts, as 
well as state legislatures, have embraced the practice for reasons that should 
make certifying questions to Congress similarly attractive to federal judges and 
Congress. 
In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,96 the Supreme Court first 
established that federal courts should abstain from deciding the meaning of 
ambiguous state laws that raise federal constitutional concerns, and should 
instead issue a stay and order the parties to litigate the state law issues in state 
court.  Only after the state court system establishes the meaning of state law will 
the case return to the federal court for resolution of the federal question, if 
necessary.97 Because abstention often resulted in significant delays, most of the 
states have now established streamlined certification procedures that allow a 
federal court to retain jurisdiction of a case while sending directly to the state 
supreme court a question about the meaning of state law.98 After the state 
supreme court decides the issue, the case returns to the federal court for a final 
decision on the question of federal law, which typically delays resolution of a 
case for no more than six months.99 
Certifying questions to Congress would follow that same basic form as 
certification to a state court:  the federal court would stay the case, retain 
jurisdiction, inform Congress of the question of statutory interpretation at issue, 
and then await a congressional response that the court will use to resolve the 
case.  The federal court could lift the stay and decide the case if Congress did not 
appear inclined to respond. 
Many of the rationales for using abstention and certification to resolve 
questions about the meaning of state law also support certifying questions of 
federal law to Congress.  Sending questions to state courts is justified on the 
ground that state judges are better situated to resolve state law issues:  state 
 
95 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1200-02 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter FALLON, HART &
WECHSLER’S] (noting that 47 jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia and Puerto 
Rico) had adopted a certification procedure, and stating that “[f]ormal and informal 
studies confirm that the use of certification is on the rise”). 
96 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
97 Although in some cases the federal court will order the case dismissed without 
prejudice, in most the federal court retains jurisdiction to ensure the prompt resolution of 
the state law issue, and to address and resolve the federal questions in the case if need be. 
98 FALLON, HART & WECHSLER’S, supra note __, at 1200-01. 
99 Id. at 1202. 
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judges are more familiar with state law and state interests and they carry the 
legitimacy that comes from having been selected through the state political 
process to construe and apply state law.100 Leaving hard questions about the 
meaning of state law to state courts also makes practical sense; state courts retain 
the last word on any state law matter, and thus a federal judge’s interpretation of 
state law might be immediately reversed by a state court pronouncement.   
The same can be said of Congress and its role in establishing the meaning of 
federal law.  As discussed in greater detail in Part IV, Congress, not the courts, is 
the proper institution to fill gaps in legislation and to clarify un-interpretable 
ambiguities or inconsistencies in statutory language.101 These are essentially acts 
of lawmaking, not law construction or implementation, and thus are best 
performed by the policy-making legislative branch.  There is no debate that 
Congress, not the judiciary, is the institution best-suited to write laws in the first 
instance; Congress has the relationship with constituents, access to information, 
and accountability to the general public that make it better qualified to engage in 
lawmaking.102 Considering their relative institutional competencies, Congress, 
not courts, should take the lead in supplying statutory meaning when litigation 
reveals that a piece of legislation leaves some significant question unanswered.  
Like state courts, Congress is also the institution with the “last word” on statutory 
meaning; Congress can, and often does, override judicial construction of federal 
statutes.103 Accordingly, when federal courts supply meaning for unclear 
statutes, they risk having wasted time and effort if Congress immediately 
overrides the judicial decision through a legislative amendment. 
Certification to state courts is also justified as a means by which federal 
courts can avoid making pronouncements about the constitutionality of 
legislation.104 A state court may construe state law to sidestep a constitutional 
problem that a federal court might otherwise have to address and resolve.  
Certification to Congress can serve the same purpose.  If Congress receives a 
question about statutory meaning from a federal court, and it learns that the court 
is concerned that the statute may be unconstitutional, Congress can clarify 
statutory language to steer clear of the constitutional conflict. 
The analogy is not exact, however.  Abstention and certification procedures 
in the context of questions about state law are intended to promote principles of 
federalism and comity – goals that judicial referrals to Congress obviously do not 
share.  State sovereignty is highly valued in our federal system, and certification 
and abstention permit states to maintain some control over interpretation and 
administration of their own laws.  Not incidentally, many of the cases in which 
abstention was first established concerned sensitive state policies (such as the 
question of race discrimination in Pullman105) and issues concerning state 
sovereignty (such as the state’s eminent domain powers in Louisiana Power and 
Light Co v. City of Thibodaux106).  Allowing state courts to decide these types of 
 
100 Id. at 1202. 
101 See infra notes __ to __. 
102 See supra note __. 
103 Eskridge, Overriding, supra note __, at 338. 
104 See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 497, (noting that abstention might prevent the court from 
having to address the constitutional question). 
105 312 U.S. 496. 
106 360 U.S. 25 (1959). 
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questions demonstrates respect for state judicial systems and avoids the friction 
that might result from a federal court decision on a delicate question of state law.     
But even though comity and federalism are not at stake when a federal court 
refers a question to Congress, such referrals do promote similar goals by 
demonstrating judicial deference to, and respect for, a co-equal branch of 
government.  Ideally, Congress and the courts would work together to make laws 
clear and easily administrable.  When a court seeks Congress’s input before 
construing ambiguous statutes, it is both notifying Congress of problems in 
statutory drafting and providing Congress with the opportunity to take the lead in 
clarifying the legislation.  Just as federal courts’ deference to states reduces 
friction between state and federal systems, similar deference to Congress may 
serve to limit the occasions on which courts and Congress come into conflict 
over the meaning of a statutory text.  Easing tensions between Congress and 
courts, always important, is particularly vital at this moment in time, when the 
two branches are very publicly clashing on an almost daily basis.107 
Despite these parallels between certification to Congress and to state courts, 
sending a statute to another court for its interpretation is admittedly different 
from sending it back to the legislature with a request that the language be 
rewritten.  The analogy is useful, however, if only to show that courts have 
accepted and even embraced a procedure that allows them to delegate the task of 
statutory construction to an outside entity, suggesting that certifying questions to 
Congress is not so foreign to current federal court practice as it might first 
appear. 
C. Delegating Questions of Statutory Interpretation to Federal 
Agencies. 
Courts regularly rely on federal agencies to assist in the interpretation of 
ambiguous federal laws.  Chevron U.S.A v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council108 and its progeny have established that courts should defer to a 
reasonable agency construction of an ambiguous statute if that interpretation was 
generated through a rulemaking proceeding carrying the force of law.  Although 
Chevron asserted that Congress had delegated the interpretive authority to 
agencies by enacting statutes that agencies are responsible for administering, of 
course it was the Supreme Court that declared that reasonable agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes should trump reasonable judicial 
interpretations.   
Chevron deference suggests that courts are comfortable giving the lead in 
statutory “clarification” to another institution.  Although courts limit agency 
authority by deferring only when a statute is truly ambiguous, the agency’s 
reading is reasonable, and the agency has acted through a deliberative process to 
produce a rule carrying the force of law, courts have nonetheless given away a 
 
107 See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservative Gathering is Mostly Quiet on Nominee, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2005, at A15 (describing a “Justice Sunday” telecast that took “aim 
mainly at power and decisions of the Supreme Court”); Donald Lambro, DeLay Slams 
Court Activism as ‘Autocracy’ Republican Sees Breach of Democratic Process,
WASHINGTON TIMES, Aug. 15, 2005, at A4 (“House Majority Leader Tom DeLay [] 
accused left-leaning courts of imposing a ‘judicial supremacy’ over the country to 
implement liberal policies that cannot win a majority in the legislative process.”); 
William Bunch, Santorum Rips Liberal Judges, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, Jan. 9, 
2006, at 7.   
108 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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significant aspect of what had formally been viewed as the judiciary’s sole power 
“to say what the law is.”109 Moreover, the rationales for doing so is that agencies 
are institutionally better suited to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in their 
governing statutes because they have more expertise and greater politically 
accountability than courts – rationales that similarly support giving Congress the 
first opportunity to resolve intractable statutory ambiguity when there is no 
agency interpretation to assist the court.110 
D. Congress’s Longstanding Practice of Clarifying Legislation in 
Pending Cases. 
Certifying questions to Congress would formalize a long tradition of 
cooperation between the two branches.  Even though no certification process is 
currently in place, Congress nonetheless amends legislation at issue in pending 
cases, often after becoming aware of judicial confusion about the meaning of 
statutory language.111 Throughout their history the federal courts have accepted, 
and at times eagerly embraced, congressional assistance in statutory 
interpretation.  United States v. Schooner Peggy112 established early on that 
courts must apply current law to pending cases even when Congress amends the 
law after the case was brought, and even when Congress’s express purpose is to 
affect the results in that case.113 In at least two cases the Supreme Court deferred 
issuing a decision to give Congress more time to consider a proposed amendment 
that would moot the case, thereby actively helping Congress to resolve the 
question before the Court was forced to address it.114 
Legislative involvement in pending cases is thus a longstanding aspect of 
legislative-judicial interactions.115 Because this practice is relevant to the 
feasibility, desirability, and constitutionality of a formal process of certifying 
questions to Congress, it is investigated in some detail here.  First, this article 
reviews the data on congressional efforts to amend statutes that have caused 
judicial confusion, which demonstrates that Congress will attempt to clarify 
statutory language when it sees courts struggling with a statute’s application, 
although it is not always successful in enacting its legislative fixes into law.  
Second, this article examines the Supreme Court’s reaction to Congress’s efforts 
to amend confusing statutory language to assist it with a pending case.     
1.  Congressional Efforts to Amend Unclear Statutory Language. 
A pair of scholars, Stefanie Lindquist and David Yalof, studied the 
frequency with which Congress reacted to circuit court conflict over statutory 
language by passing legislation to resolve the question, thereby obviating 
Supreme Court review.  They discovered that between 1990 and 1998, Congress 
“sought to amend existing statutes or to pass new legislation to resolve at least 19 
 
109 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
110 See infra notes __ to __ . 
111 See, e.g., Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp, 494 U.S. 472 (1990); United States 
Department of Treasury v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556 (1986); United States Department of 
Justice v. Provenzano, 469 U.S. 14 (1984). 
112 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). 
113 See also Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974) 
(holding that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision”). 
114 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792); 463 U.S. 1224 (1983). 
115 In contrast, the frequency of congressional overrides of judicial decisions has been 
widely studied.  See, e.g., Eskridge, Override, supra note __. 
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instances of conflict among the circuits.”116 During that time, 66 different 
appeals court decisions were identified in legislation seeking to resolve 26 
different circuit court conflicts.  Attached to their article is a table that describes 
the proposed bills, the conflicts each was enacted to resolve, and whether the bill 
was enacted into law.  Lindquist and Yalof conclude from this data that 
“Congress adopts some role in ensuring that its statutes are applied uniformly 
throughout the country, although Congress is not nearly as active as the Supreme 
Court in this area.”117 
Lindquist and Yalof concluded that Congress is more likely to get involved 
in resolving intercircuit splits when the Supreme Court denies certiorari.  
However, because Congress may not be able to react to a circuit conflict with 
sufficient speed to address the issue before the Supreme Court grants the case 
and resolves the question, congressional silence does not necessarily suggest a 
desire to let the Supreme Court resolve the issue in the first instance.  At the very 
least, the fact that Congress takes an interest in reacting to circuit splits, even 
though it does not always manage to enact legislation to resolve them, suggests 
that Congress is willing to play a role in clarifying unclear statutes.   
2. Judicial Reaction to Congressional Interference in Pending 
Cases. 
 Congress frequently affects the results in pending cases when it amends 
legislation.  Courts have developed doctrines to deal with this recurring situation 
– for example, courts generally hold that an amendment to a relevant statute will 
moot a pending case that turns on the now-altered provision.118 On occasion, 
courts have actively assisted Congress in its efforts to moot pending cases by 
staying a case to await passage of a proposed bill.  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s 
decision to grant a writ of certiorari may turn on whether it appears that the 
statute at issue will be amended in the near future. 
 As is evident from the cases discussed below, judicial reaction to 
congressional interference in pending cases is generally positive.  Courts appear 
to welcome Congressional assistance in resolving disputes over statutory 
meaning, and express concern about Congressional interference only when it 
appears that Congress is legislating to control the outcome of a specific case 
rather than clarifying the law generally.   
a. Hayburn’s Case 
Hayburn’s Case,119 which concerns Revolutionary War veteran William 
Hayburn’s efforts to obtain a pension for his military service, has become a 
constitutional chestnut; it is one of the very oldest cases still regularly cited by 
courts.  Yet the Supreme Court never actually issued an opinion on the merits, 
choosing instead to postpone a decision in the hope that Congress would amend 
the legislation at issue, as Congress ultimately did.  The case is a classic example 
judicial effort to avoid a confrontation with Congress – especially important at 
this early stage in the nation’s history when the federal courts had not yet 
established their authority to strike down acts of Congress as unconstitutional. 
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Hayburn had claimed eligibility for a federal pension under the Invalid 
Pension Act of 1792.  The Act required injured veterans of the Revolutionary 
War to petition the judges of the United States Circuit Courts, who were to 
determine whether the petitioner qualified for a pension.  The judges were then to 
submit the name and a recommendation for the amount of the pension to the 
Secretary of War, who would review the evidence and could reverse the court’s 
conclusion about whether the petitioner qualified for a pension.   
 Hayburn petitioned the United States Circuit Court for the District of 
Pennsylvania for his pension.  The panel of judges refused to hear his case and 
instead wrote to President Washington to explain that they believed the Pension 
Act was invalid because it provided that the executive branch could reverse a 
decision of the judicial branch.  The court explained that “[s]uch revision and 
control we deemed radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial 
power which is vested in the courts.”120 In August 1792, Attorney General 
Edmund Randolph asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus 
compelling the federal circuit court in Pennsylvania to act on Hayburn’s petition.  
The Court did not issue a decision on the merits, however, but instead agreed to 
hold the motion under advisement until the next term – apparently concerned 
about offending Congress by declaring the law unconstitutional.121 As one legal 
historian explained, the “justices clearly hoped that Congress would change the 
Invalid Pension law before the Court actually issued an opinion on the mandamus 
motion.”122 
Congress did just that.  A few days before the Court’s next term ended, 
Congress passed “An Act to regulate Claims to Invalid Pensions” that amended 
the procedures to be followed by petitioning veterans and eliminated the 
constitutional problems.123 The Supreme Court never issued a decision on the 
merits of the case, apparently viewing the amended law as mooting the issue and 
requiring Hayburn to follow the amended procedure in order to receive his 
pension.   
Hayburn’s Case is an early example of the Court’s willingness to avoid 
issuing a decision while awaiting Congressional legislation that would obviate 
the need to address the constitutionality of a piece of legislation.  It also 
demonstrates Congress’s ability to amend statutes that are raising problems for 
courts in pending cases.  As described further below, Congress and the Court 
have continued to work together to resolve issues in statutes without either 
branch expressing concern that the other has overstepped its constitutional 
bounds. 
 
120 Letter from James Wilson, John Blair and Richard Peters to George Washington, 
April 18, 1792 1 American State Papers, Miscellaneous 51 (1834).  The letter is also 
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122 Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn’s Case:  A Misinterpretation of Precedent,
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decision, but instead simply transmitted a list of claims along with the evidence to the 
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the veterans would receive a pension. 
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b. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Sholly.124
Sholly provides a more recent example of a case in which the Court 
purposely postponed a decision while awaiting an amendment to the legislation 
at issue in the case.  Respondents opposed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 
determination that the Atomic Energy Act permitted it to approve an amendment 
to the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor’s operating license without a hearing, 
and the court of appeals had agreed that the Commission lacked the authority to 
do so.  The Commission sought review in the Supreme Court, and at the same 
time proposed to Congress legislation authorizing the Commission to amend a 
license without a hearing.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 26, 
1981,125 but twice postponed oral argument to give Congress the opportunity to 
consider the legislation.126 Finally, in January of 1983, Congress enacted the 
Commission’s proposed legislation and the Supreme Court remanded the case so 
that the lower court could consider whether it was now moot. 
Sholly demonstrates the benefits of judicial-legislative cooperation to 
resolve a dispute over unclear legislation.  The Court must have believed that the 
issue would be better addressed by Congress in the first instance, which is why it 
postponed issuing a decision to await forthcoming legislation.  Indeed, had the 
Supreme Court gone ahead and decided the case in favor of respondents, and had 
Congress then amended the legislation shortly thereafter, the entire judicial 
process would have been an unnecessary waste.  With the new legislation in 
place, the Commission would have been free to amend the license without a 
hearing, just as it had attempted to do earlier.  Of course, if the Supreme Court 
had decided the case in favor of the Commission, then the legislation would have 
been unnecessary.  But the Court (and possibly also Congress) appears to have 
believed that it would be better for this determination to be made through a clear 
legislative directive rather than a judicial construction of an ambiguous statutory 
provision. 
c. Additional Recent Cases. 
In a host of other cases Congress has amended legislation after the Supreme 
Court has granted certiorari but before it has issued its ruling.  The legislative 
history reveals that Congress was aware that the Supreme Court was on the verge 
of deciding a case regarding statutory meaning and that it sought to resolve the 
issue before the Court did. 
United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms v. Galioto127 concerned an equal protection challenge to a statute 
prohibiting firearms sales to anyone adjudicated a mental defective or committed 
to a mental institution, but permitting such sales to convicted felons.  The lower 
court struck down the statute after concluding that there was no rational basis for 
the distinction.128 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction over the appeal 
on November 4, 1985, and the case was argued on March 26, 1986.  Meanwhile, 
Congress redrafted the legislation so that felons and the mentally ill were treated 
alike, and the House Report accompanying the legislation noted that this 
amendment should resolve the issue in the pending Supreme Court case.129 In its 
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125 451 U.S. 1016 (1981). 
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129 The House Report of March 14, 1986, stated: 
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subsequent opinion a month later, the Court commented that this “enactment 
significantly alters the posture of this case,” and concluded that the case was now 
moot.130 
Department of Justice v. Provenzano131 questioned whether the Privacy Act 
of 1974 qualified as an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act and thus 
permitted withholding information from the public.  The Third and Seventh 
Circuits had issued conflicting decisions, and on April 2, 1984, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for argument.132 On October 
15, 1984, the President signed into law an amendment to the Privacy Act stating:  
“No agency shall rely on an exemption in this section to withhold from an 
individual any record which is otherwise accessible to such individual under [the 
Freedom of Information Act].”133 The House Report commented on the pending 
Supreme Court case and stated that “[w]hatever ambiguity exists will be removed 
by this change in the Privacy Act.”134 The parties agreed that this amendment 
mooted their dispute, and the cases were remanded for final resolution under the 
new legal standard. 
United States v. New Jersey State Lottery Commission135 concerned the 
application of 18 U.S.C. § 1304, a federal statute that prohibited radio stations 
from broadcasting information about lotteries.  Jersey Cape, a radio station, had 
sued for declaratory relief arguing that section 1304 should not apply to the 
broadcast of a winning number in a lawful state-run lottery such as the one 
conducted in New Jersey.  The Third Circuit reversed the Federal 
Communications Commission and ruled that section 1304 did not prohibit 
broadcast of lawful state lottery results.  This decision conflicted with an earlier 
Second Circuit ruling, leading to the Supreme Court’s decision to review the 
case. 
 
The failure of the Gun Control Act to provide a procedure for relief of former 
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Id. at 14. 
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After the case had been briefed and argued, Congress, aware of the Supreme 
Court case, passed a new statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1307, which stated that “[t]he 
provisions of section . . . 1304 shall not apply to an advertisement, list of prizes, 
or information concerning a lottery conducted by a State acting under authority 
of State law.”136 The Court noted the change in the law and remanded the case to 
the court of appeals to determine whether the case was moot.137 
Conclusion 
These cases demonstrate that Congress has the institutional capacity to 
resolve statutory ambiguity after the Supreme Court has granted certiorari but 
before the Court has an opportunity to rule on the question.  Just as interesting, 
the Court appears to welcome Congress’s efforts to moot pending cases by 
clarifying the legislation at issue.  As Lindquist and Yalof’s study reveals, 
Congress also takes notice of judicial confusion in the lower courts and seeks to 
resolve such conflicts by clarifying legislation.  Congress may step in because it 
wants to assist courts in applying unclear statutes, or, more likely, because it 
wants to wrest control of statutory meaning from the judiciary.  Whatever its 
reasons, Congress is already responding to judicial confusion through 
amendments that affect results in pending cases, albeit in an inconsistent and ad 
hoc fashion, which suggests that we should give serious consideration to the idea 
of establishing a more structured and formalized process by which courts refer 
hard questions about statutory meaning to Congress. 
Admittedly, however, there is a darker side to this legislative practice of 
amending legislation to affect results in pending cases.  During some of the most 
unstable periods of American history, Congress has passed legislation seeking to 
ensure that it would obtain the judicial outcomes it desired.  In Ex parte 
McCardle138, for example, Congress enacted legislation stripping the Supreme 
Court of jurisdiction to hear McCardle’s habeas corpus petition just a few days 
after the case was argued in the Supreme Court.  McCardle was challenging the 
constitutionality of provisions of the Military Reconstruction Act– a challenge 
that Congress had reason to think the Court might decide in McCardle’s favor – 
and so Congress sought to prevent the Court from hearing and deciding the 
issue.139 The Court agreed it no longer had jurisdiction over the case as a result 
of the legislation, but its acquiescence has been viewed as troubling.  The Court 
did not permit Congress to control the results in United States v. Klein140, a case 
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from the same post-Civil War period in which Congress sought to prevent the 
Court from awarding compensation for the Union’s seizure of property during 
that war.  Congress was unhappy with the Court’s previous decisions granting 
compensation, and so it enacted legislation attempting to force the Court to reach 
a different result in Klein’s case.  This time, the Court refused to defer to 
Congress, although the constitutional grounds for its refusal to do so have 
remained unclear.141 
The legislation enacted on the eve of the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
McCardle and Klein was not intended to clarify statutory ambiguity or eliminate 
constitutional problems in legislation, but instead sought to strip the Court of 
power to decide these cases in ways that Congress did not like.  These attempts 
by Congress to aggrandize itself at the expense of the judiciary can be 
distinguished from cases such as Hayburn’s Case or Sholly in which Congress 
enacted legislation intended to assist courts with statutory construction.  
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that Congress’s power to affect the 
results in pending cases gives Congress the ability both to aid courts and to 
undermine their authority.  Any certification procedure must take into account 
the troubling possibility that Congress might misuse an enhanced ability to affect 
results in pending cases. 
III.   Structuring Certification to Satisfy Constitutional Restraints on the 
Roles of Courts and Congress. 
 Before discussing the normative implications of encouraging courts to 
certify questions about statutory meaning to Congress, the first question to be 
answered is whether such a practice would be constitutionally permissible.  
Judicial referrals to Congress raise significant separation of powers concerns.  
The formalist view of separation of powers requires that each branch perform its 
assigned tasks with rigid independence from the others.142 Functionalist theories 
are more flexible, conceding that the branches may engage in activities outside of 
their narrow, constitutionally assigned tasks, but only so long as they do not 
diminish the constitutional stature of another branch by taking over its essential 
functions.143 Under either view, a process by which courts stay cases and refer 
specific questions about those cases to Congress for resolution comes 
dangerously close to impermissibly mixing the legislative and judicial 
functions.144 The discussion below seeks to show that judicial referrals to 
Congress can avoid running afoul of constitutional limitations as long as referrals 
are structured so that neither the court nor the legislature crosses boundaries that 
delineate the judicial from the legislative power.   
 
141 For a more detailed discussion of the facts of Klein, the Court’s holding, and limits on 
Congress’s power to control results in pending cases, see discussion infra notes __ to __.  
142 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PENN.
L. REV. 1513, 1530 (1991) 
143 See, e.g., id. at 1530 (1991) (describing “the scholarly debate about separated powers” 
as “polarized, for the most part, between the formalists and the functionalists – a battle 
between those who would pay the price of rigidity in order to achieve an elusive 
determinacy on the one hand, and those who would pay the price of indeterminacy in 
order to achieve unguided flexibility on the other”); 
144 As the Supreme Court stated when striking down the legislative veto, “even useful 
‘political inventions’ are subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers 
and, with respect to this subject, sets out just how those powers are to be exercised.”  
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945. 
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From the very beginning of the Union, courts have concluded that they are 
compelled to apply the law as it exists at the time of the decision, even if that law 
has recently been altered by Congress.145 Accordingly, even without any formal 
certification system in place, it is clear that Congress may amend legislation to 
resolve a dispute pending before a court – indeed, as just discussed, Congress has 
often done so.146 This long tradition demonstrates that legislation intended to 
resolve pending court cases is not, per se, unconstitutional.  The only question, 
then, is whether a formal certification process under which courts encourage 
Congress to pass such legislation transforms a constitutionally permissible 
practice into an impermissible one.  This article concludes that certifying 
questions to Congress does have constitutional implications that must be 
addressed in the structure of the certification process.  As long as these limits are 
in place, however, judicial referrals to Congress do not overstep constitutional 
boundaries.  Below is a description of the constitutional concerns raised by 
certification of questions from courts to Congress, and then a discussion of the 
ways in which the process can be shaped to fit within constitutional parameters. 
A. Judicial Communication with Congress. 
A certification process would require judges to communicate with the 
legislative branch about pending cases.  Communication between the judiciary 
and the other branches of government is not by itself unusual or suspect; indeed, 
it happens all the time.147 Federal judges frequently appear before Congress to 
answer questions about their work and discuss the need for funding, staff, and 
other resources.  And judges regularly communicate with the executive branch 
during litigation.  The Supreme Court will seek the Solicitor General’s views on 
the merits of petitions for writs of certiorari, and federal judges are required by 
statute to inform the U.S. Attorney General or the relevant state attorney general 
whenever they are asked to decide a case challenging the constitutionality of an 
Act of Congress or a state statute.  Courts must “certify such fact” to the requisite 
executive officer and then must allow the executive to intervene and participate 
as a party in the case.148 Permitting judges similarly to communicate with 
Congress during pending cases would therefore not appear to present any 
particular constitutional problem. 
Constitutional questions would arise, however, were Congress to require 
judicial consultation during pending cases, because then Congress would come 
dangerously close to inserting itself into the judicial process and taking over the 
judicial power to decide “cases” and “controversies.”  Accordingly, the impetus 
 
145 Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. at 110 (“[I]f subsequent to the judgment and before the 
decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which 
governs, the law must be obeyed.”); Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 
711 (1974) (“[A] court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, 
unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or 
legislative history to the contrary.”) 
146 See supra notes __ - __.   
147 See, e.g., Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators:  Renewing the Relationship,
52 OHIO ST. L. J. 279, 279 (1991) (“History suggests that dialogue between the 
legislative and judicial branches of government was anticipated by the framers of the 
Constitution.”). 
148 28 U.S.C. 2403; see e.g., Merill v. Town of Addison, 763 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(certification to state attorney general that action had been filed in federal court 
challenging the constitutionality of state statute is duty of court that should not be 
ignored, even if claim is obviously frivolous and may be disposed of on other grounds). 
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for referrals must come from the courts, not Congress.  Congress would be 
walking very close to the constitutional line were it to enact legislation requiring 
courts to abstain from deciding questions before consulting Congress in any 
category of cases.  Likewise, judges cannot order Congress to respond to their 
questions about statutory meaning.  A recognized attribute of the legislative 
power is the “exercise [of] discretion in determining whether and what legislation 
is needed,”149 and, consequently, courts cannot dictate the legislative agenda by 
demanding Congress clarify statutes in response to judicial questions.  
A formal procedure of certifying questions to Congress need not go so far, 
however.  To ensure its constitutionality, both branches should be permitted to 
take part only if and when they choose to do so.  As a result, even if a 
certification process was formally created, such as through a rule of procedure or 
through a legislative enactment, courts might choose not to use the procedure 
and, even if they did, Congress might choose not to respond.  This flexibility 
would be essential to ensuring the procedure did not improperly intrude into 
either branch’s constitutionally-assigned realm.     
B. The Form of Congress’s Response. 
If Congress did choose to respond to a judicial inquiry into the meaning of 
an ambiguous statute, what form must that response take?  Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha,150 makes clear that Congress can “clarify” 
statutory meaning only in accordance with the bicameral passage and presidential 
presentment requirements of Article I.  As the Supreme Court declared in 
Chadha, “[t]hese provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the constitutional 
design for the separation of powers” and cannot be compromised.151 In short, 
Congress must enact a new law if it wishes to clarify the meaning of an existing 
one.  
Of course, individual members of Congress would be free to issue 
statements proclaiming their own understanding of the meaning of the statutory 
language at issue in a pending case.  And Congress as a whole could pass a non-
binding resolution on the question.  But a court can give such statements no more 
weight than it gives to any other post-enactment legislative history – that is, 
virtually none at all.152 Unless Congress actually amends the law at issue, the 
court has received no congressional guidance as to the meaning of the statute and 
should go ahead and decide the case on its own. 
 In essence, then, a judicial referral is not seeking the current Congress’s 
interpretation of a previously enacted statute, but instead is enlisting the current 
Congress’s help by asking it to revise a poorly drafted statute.  Congress is not 
bound to clarify the statute to accord with what it thinks the original enacting 
Congress would have wanted.  Just as Congress is always free to change laws by 
amendment, the Congress that receives a judicial referral may choose to radically 
alter, rather than to clarify, the statute at issue. 
 Some might argue that this process gives the current legislature too much 
control over the meaning of legislation, and does so at the expense of the wishes 
 
149 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
150 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
151 Id. at 946. 
152 See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp. 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) 
(“[S]ubsequent legislative history is a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier 
Congress.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). 
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of the enacting legislature.  Although Congress always has the power to amend 
legislation, Congress is busy and has limited resources, and so more often than 
not would leave even problematic legislation in place.153 But if Congress is 
notified by the courts of a legislative ambiguity and then given a limited window 
of time in which to fix the problem so as to affect the results in pending cases, 
Congress is more likely to take action.  The influence of the enacting Congress 
will be diminished, while the Congress in power at the time of a judicial decision 
will have a greater say in the meaning of the legislation. 
 One response to this concern is that the enacting legislature retains all of its 
power over the meaning of its legislation as long as it speaks clearly in the first 
instance.  It is only when the enacting legislature passes unclear statutes that 
courts could certify questions to be resolved by the current Congress.  Moreover, 
even without a certification procedure in place, an enacting legislature risks 
frustration of its purpose when it fails to speak clearly in a statutory text – the 
only difference being that it is judges with cases before them, rather than the 
current Congress, who determine the statute’s meaning.  Furthermore, although 
judges purport to resolve statutory ambiguity with reference to the enacting 
legislature’s preferences, legal scholars have observed that judges frequently 
interpret statutes in light of current political preferences – perhaps out of a desire 
to avoid congressional overrides, or perhaps because judges are not as insulated 
from political pressures as their lifetime appointments might suggest.154 And 
maybe this is for the best.  Professor Elhauge has suggested that each legislature 
would prefer that courts apply statutes in accord with the current legislature’s 
preferences rather than those of the enacting legislature, reasoning that “[a]s a 
general matter, political preferences for a given statutory result are likely to be 
stronger in the present because those who hold those preferences (and elect the 
government) are those who experience that result.”155 As Elhauge notes, the 
political preferences of those very same politicians (and electors) might have 
changed by the time the statute is being construed years in the future, and thus 
the enacting legislature might not even wish a court to interpret its legislative acts 
as it would have originally intended.156 
Elhauge’s critics question how courts are to “divine” current legislative 
preferences.  As Professor Amanda Tyler has noted in her trenchant critique, 
“sources for ascertaining such [legislative] preferences are limited and we deal 
by definition with an area in which the current legislature has not acted (at least 
not in any formal way).”157 More often than not, the current Congress will not 
have given the legislative question before a court any thought at all.  Do we 
really think that members of Congress spend their time pondering the statute of 
limitations for retaliation claims in the False Claims Act, for example?  If 
Congress has not even thought about the issue – as will often by the case when 
courts address minor technical questions about a statute’s application – then there 
will simply be no legislative preference for courts to discover.158 Tyler also 
 
153 See supra notes __ to __ (describing how Congress frequently proposes amendments 
to clarify ambiguous legislation but often fails to enact these amendments into law). 
154 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note __.  Elhauge, 
Preference-Estimating, supra note __, at __. 
155 Id. at 2039. 
156 Id. 
157 Tyler, supra note __, at 1407. 
158 Id.
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raises as a concern the merging of legislative and judicial functions that would 
likely occur were courts seriously to attempt to “track[] current political 
maneuvering” and monitor the “ebbs and flows of the legislative process” in an 
effort to guess Congress’s preferences regarding a statute’s interpretation.159 She 
cites these problems as serious flaws in Elhauge’s proposal.  
Certifying questions to Congress avoids those problems by requiring the 
current legislature to enact its preferences if it wishes to assist courts in applying 
ambiguous statutes.  Courts will not be second-guessing Congress based on the 
statements in committee reports attached to bills that never become law, as 
Elhauge suggests, but will instead be applying statutory text directly addressing 
the problem in the case at hand.  At the same time, certification realizes 
Elhauge’s primary goal of incorporating the current legislature’s preferences into 
the meaning of unclear statutes.  It does so by alerting Congress to the problem 
and giving Congress time (through abstention) and an incentive (in the form of a 
pending case in which the meaning of the statute must be resolved) to take 
action. 
C. The Substance of Congress’s Response 
The fact that Congress may pass an amendment that changes the meaning of 
a law, rather than merely clarifies an ambiguity, raises a more troubling concern:  
Congress may use the referral process to control the outcome in a specific case, 
arguably usurping the judicial power to resolve cases and controversies.160 
The constitutional structure that separates judging from legislating impliedly 
forbids this type of legislation.  As Chief Justice John Marshall declared:  “It is 
the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the 
government of society; the application of those rules would seem to be the duty 
of other departments.”161 Moreover, specific constitutional provisions, such as 
the Bills of Attainder,162 Equal Protection,163 Due Process,164 and Ex Post Facto165 
Clauses all seek to protect individuals from this type of targeted legislation.  In 
Federalist Number 47, Madison explained that under the U.S. Constitution the 
“legislature can perform no judiciary act,” and he quoted Montesquieu’s 
declaration that “‘[w]ere the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life 
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control.’”166 In sum, as 
Professor Martin Redish put it, Congress “may not, through legislation, dictate 
the resolution of individual litigation.”167 
159 Id. at 1408. 
160 See, e.g., J. Richard Doidge, Note: Is Purely Retroactive Legislation Limited by the 
Separation of Powers?:  Rethinking United States v. Klein, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 910, 
941-42 (1994); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959-967 (Powell, J., concurring). 
161 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 U.S. (Cranch) 87, 136 (1810). 
162 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
163 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
164 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1. 
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
166 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at __ (J. Madison)  
167 Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence:  Constitutional and Political 
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 718 (1995); see also Doidge, supra note __, at 
941 (“Intuitively, the legislature’s ability to manipulate the results of pending litigation 
undermines the ideal of ordered liberty and the protections against tyranny for which 
divided government strives.”). 
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At least three separation of powers values are implicated by legislation 
targeting specific cases.  First, dividing judging from legislating protects the 
litigants by ensuring that laws are applied by politically-insulated judges through 
safeguards that accompany the judicial process, such as notice and an opportunity 
to be heard.168 When Congress enacts legislation affecting large categories of the 
population, it has incentives to draft laws that are just and reasonable; conversely, 
when its laws single out only a very narrow category of people or cases, 
Congress is unrestrained by political pressures and, of course, need not adhere to 
the structures of adjudication.  To the contrary, the pressures to please the 
majority may push Congress to target individuals for disfavored treatment.  As 
Justice Powell observed:  “Congress is most accountable politically when it 
prescribes rules of general applicability.  When it decides rights of specific 
persons, those rights are subject to ‘the tyranny of a shifting majority.’”169
A second, and related, concern is that Congress can often avoid being held 
accountable for legislation favoring individuals and small groups.  Although 
retroactive legislation is often feared because of its potential to target individuals 
for punishment, it can just as easily be used to provide benefits to the 
influential.170 For example, Congress has a history of inserting last-minute riders 
in appropriations bills that command the outcome in a specific case 
“notwithstanding” the statutes governing that area of law.171 These case-specific 
amendments to legislation enable Congress to target individuals for special 
treatment without taking the political heat that would accompany passage of a 
law enacted after hearings and a committee vote.172 
Third, by enacting case-specific legislation, Congress usurps the judiciary’s 
power.  The Framers were generally concerned that one branch of government 
might seek to aggrandize its own power at the expense of the others, and in 
particular worried that the legislature – whose “powers” are “at once more 
extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits” – would encroach on the 
functions of the other two branches.173 When Congress legislates to control the 
outcome of the particular case, it appears to be doing just that.   
Despite these constitutional concerns, there is no clear precedent forbidding 
Congress from legislating for the individual case.  Strands of reasoning from the 
few cases to address this problem do strongly suggest, however, that Congress is 
walking on constitutional thin ice when it passes legislation targeting specific 
 
168 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 966 (“Unlike the judiciary or an administrative agency, Congress 
is not bound by established substantive rules.  Nor is it subject to the procedural 
safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial tribunal, that are 
present when a court or agency adjudicates individual rights.”) (internal footnote 
omitted). 
169 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring).  See also LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 998 (1978) (The legislature may not “pick and choose 
only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus [] escape the political retribution 
that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.”). 
170 James Madison expressed that concern in Federalist No. 44.  See also Landgraf v. 
USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 267 n.20 (1994). 
171 Nagle, supra note __, at 1283-1284.  
172 In its amicus curiae brief in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, et al., ___, Public 
Citizen listed a number of examples of such case-specific riders, which it said 
exemplified the type of legislative overreaching that the Court should strike down as an 
unconstitutional encroachment on the judicial branch. 
173 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at __ (J. Madison) 
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pending cases.  In addition, various constitutional provisions prohibit Congress 
from singling out individuals for legislative penalties.   
1. Limits on Congress’s Power to Control the Outcome in Individual 
Cases.
The Court’s decision in United States v. Klein174 came closest to establishing 
that Congress cannot enact legislation to control the results in specific cases.  The 
case arose from the turmoil of the post-Civil War period.  Klein, administrator of 
the estate of V.F. Wilson, sued the United States in the Court of Claims pursuant 
to the Abandoned and Captured Property Act of March 3, 1863, which permitted 
the owner of property seized during the Civil War to receive compensation for 
the loss of property “on proof to the satisfaction of  [the Court of Claims] . . . that 
he has never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion.”175 President 
Lincoln had proclaimed that “certain persons who had been engaged in the 
rebellion” would be pardoned and have their property restored to them upon 
taking an oath of allegiance to the Union, and Wilson had taken this oath.176 The 
Court of Claims ruled that Wilson’s pardon entitled his estate to compensation 
under the statute, and the government then appealed that decision to the Supreme 
Court.177
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court heard an appeal in Padelford v. 
United States178 concerning a similarly-situated claimant.  The Supreme Court 
agreed with the Court of Claims that the presidential pardon entitled Padelford to 
the proceeds of his property.  In response, Congress enacted a law providing that:  
1) a Presidential pardon would not be admissible evidence in favor of a claimant 
seeking compensation under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act; 2) the 
Supreme Court was to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction any appeal from a 
judgment of the Court of Claims in which the claimant established his loyalty 
through a pardon; and 3) the Court of Claims was to consider evidence that the 
claimant had received a pardon as “conclusive evidence that such person did take 
part in, and give aid and comfort to, the late rebellion,” and to dismiss any 
lawsuit on a claimant’s behalf for lack of jurisdiction.179 
In a wide-ranging opinion, the Court struck down the new law. The Court 
articulated several grounds for its holding, and so it is impossible to know which, 
if any, would have been decisive alone. Most relevant here is the strand of the 
Court’s opinion establishing that Congress cannot “prescribe rules of decision to 
the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it.”180 By 
stripping the Court of jurisdiction over any case in which a pardon was granted, 
and ordering that a pardon be considered evidence supporting a conclusion 
contrary to the one the Court had previously reached, Congress was seeking to 
control the outcome of a pending case and thus had “passed the limit which 
separates the legislative from the judicial power.”181 In a recent discussion of 
Klein’s holding, the Court again emphasized that a key problem with the 
legislation was Congress’s attempt to lay down rules to control the outcome of a 
 
174 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). 
175 Id. at 131. 
176 Id. at 132. 
177 Wilson v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 559 (1869). 
178 9 Wall 531 (1870). 
179 Id. at 134.   
180 Id. at 146. 
181 Id. at 147.  
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case currently before the Supreme Court (and, not incidentally, to obtain an 
outcome in the government’s favor).182
Although Klein declares that there are constitutional limits on Congress’s 
ability to legislate to control results in individual cases, the opinion was muddled, 
came at a particularly tense moment in congressional-judicial relations, and its 
conclusion has rarely been revisited.  It is thus only shaky precedent to support 
the conclusion that Congress is not permitted to enact legislation seeking to 
control the outcome in a pending case.183
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society184 provides the most recent guidepost 
in this area.185 Environmental groups and companies in the timber industry had 
 
182 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
183 Moreover, Klein is at least in some tension with the Court’s earlier decision in 
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855), 
which Klein nonetheless declared was still good law.  In Wheeling Bridge, the Court 
declared that a bridge too low for certain boats to pass under was a nuisance and issued 
an injunction requiring its removal.  Congress subsequently passed a law legalizing the 
structure and making it a post-road.  The Court then held that the bridge had ceased to be 
a nuisance as a result of the new legislation.   
Klein sought to distinguish Wheeling Bridge on the ground that in the latter case 
Congress had actually changed the circumstances to which the law should apply, while in 
the former nothing had changed and Congress was simply trying to force the Court to 
draw different conclusions from the evidence than the Court would have on its own.  But 
at the very least Wheeling Bridge suggests that congressional efforts to control results in 
specific cases are not per se unconstitutional. 
184 503 U.S. 429 (1992) 
185 The most recent and well-known example of targeted legislation was inspired by the 
case of Theresa Marie Schiavo, a brain-damaged Florida woman.  Schiavo had been in a 
vegetative state for 13 years when a Florida state judge found that Schiavo would not 
have wanted to continue living in such a state and ordered that her nutrition and hydration 
be discontinued.  Schiavo’s parents were strongly opposed to the order, which they 
believed reflected the wishes of Schiavo’s husband but not Schiavo herself.   
The U.S. Congress responded to the state court order by passing an Act, signed into 
law at approximately 1 am on March 21, 2005, entitled, “An Act for the relief of the 
parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.”  P.L. 109-3.  The law was explicitly limited in 
application to Schiavo.  It ordered the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Florida to “hear determine, and render judgment” on any claim of “alleged violation of 
any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of the United States 
relating to the withholding or withdrawal of foods, fluids, or medical treatment necessary 
to sustain life.”  The law gave standing only to Schiavo’s parents to bring such a suit, and 
permitted the district court to give relief “to protect the rights of Theresa Marie Schiavo” 
alone. Anticipating barriers to a federal lawsuit, the Act required that the district court 
review all claims “de novo,” that it not abstain in favor of state court proceedings, and 
that it not await exhaustion of state law remedies.  To limit its effect to Schiavo, Congress 
declared that the new law “shall not be construed to create substantive rights not 
otherwise secured by the Constitution and the law of the United States or of the several 
States” and did not “constitute a precedent with respect to future legislation.”   
Schiavo’s parents immediately filed a complaint and motion for a temporary 
restraining order.  Most of the federal judges asked to address the motion simply assumed 
the constitutionality of the legislation and denied the motion on other grounds.  One 
exception was Judge Birch, of the U.S Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, who 
concurred in the denial of rehearing en banc to declare that the law violated separation of 
powers because Congress “arrogat[ed] vital judicial functions to itself.”  Although he 
focused his arguments on the law’s alteration of the standard of review and abrogation of 
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challenged the government’s regulation of harvesting and sale of timber in old-
growth forests in the Pacific Northwest, which were home to the endangered 
northern spotted owl.  The environmental groups argued that the regulation was 
too lax, the timber industry that it was too restrictive.  In response to the 
litigation, Congress enacted the Northwest Timber Compromise, which 
established new requirements for the Forest Service’s management of the forests 
at issue – requirements that (supposedly) represented a compromise position 
between the demands of the environmental groups and the loggers.  The law then 
provided that compliance with these new statutory requirements would be 
considered “adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory 
requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases,” and cited the names 
and docket numbers of both cases.186 Loggers argued that the new law mooted 
the pending cases, while environmental groups challenged it on separation of 
powers grounds.   
The Ninth Circuit was troubled by the law’s specificity, and particularly its 
attempt to control the outcome of the explicitly-referenced pending cases.  Citing 
to Klein, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Northwest Timber Compromise 
crossed the constitutional line between legislation and adjudication.  According 
to the Ninth Circuit, the “critical distinction” is “between the actual repeal or 
amendment of the law underlying the litigation, which is permissible, and the 
actual direction of a particular decision in a case, without repealing or amending 
the law underlying the litigation, which is not permissible.”187 Because the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that Congress had done the latter, it invalidated the law.   
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s description of the effect of 
the Northwest Timber Compromise, finding that Congress had changed the 
underlying legal standard.188 The Supreme Court thus had no occasion to address 
the correctness of the “critical distinction” that the Ninth Circuit drew from 
Klein. Although that ultimate question was postponed, the decision demonstrates 
that Congress can enact legislation limited to explicitly identified pending cases 
and yet the Court will conclude that it did not cross the line into exclusive 
judicial territory. 
Also left unresolved was the issue raised in the case by Public Citizen, a 
nonprofit public interest group acting as amicus curiae.  Public Citizen contended 
that even if the law did change underlying legal standards, it might still be 
unconstitutional “if the change [in law] swept no more broadly, or little more 
broadly, than the range of applications at issue in the pending cases.”189 That is, 
 
the rules of exhaustion and abstention, his real concern seemed to be that Congress 
changed the rules for a single individual.  He concluded by stating that “because the Act 
applies to only this case it lacks the generality and prospectivity of legislation that 
comports with the basic tenets of the separation of powers.” 
Judges Tjoflat and Wilson dissented from denial of rehearing en banc.  The 
dissenters argued that Congress had the constitutional power to change the standard of 
review and other procedural rules:  “Congress has prescribed a particular approach to a 
particular problem in the general domain of federal jurisdiction, without presuming to 
dictate – in any respect – our performance of a court’s essential function:  ‘to say what 
the law is.’”   
186 Section 318(b)(6)(A) of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 1990, 103 Stat. 745. 
187 914 F.2d at 1315. 
188 Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
189 503 U.S. at 441 (citing brief of amicus Public Citizen). 
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Public Citizen argued that Congress oversteps its bounds when it enacts 
legislation targeting a few cases, even if that legislation purports to change 
underlying legal standards.  The Supreme Court specifically noted this objection 
in its opinion, but did not address it on the ground that it had not been raised 
below.190 
The unanswered Public Citizen objection in Robertson goes to the heart of 
constitutional concerns raised by the process of certifying questions to Congress.  
Normally, the legislature enacts general rules that affect large classes of the 
population, while courts apply those general rules to individual cases.191 If 
Congress responds to a judicial referral by seeking to control the outcome in a 
pending case, it might well cross the constitutional line that separates legislating 
from judging, as well as violate constitutional principles intended to prevent the 
abuses that can occur when the power to legislate targets individuals.  Klein and 
its progeny address the separation of powers concerns and suggest that there are 
constitutional limits on Congress’s power to legislate for specific cases, but leave 
the exact parameters of Congress’s authority unclear. 
Under the law as it stands today, Congress has the ability to enact laws 
targeting pending cases, and courts have the obligation to review those laws to 
determine whether Congress has strayed too far into judicial territory.  Permitting 
courts to refer questions to Congress admittedly provides more opportunities for 
Congress to misuse its power, but it does not change any fundamental aspect of 
the legislative process to give Congress more leeway to do so.  If Congress were 
to respond to certified questions by seeking to control the outcome of specific 
pending cases rather than to amend the legislation generally, the Supreme Court 
could revisit the parameters of Congress’s power to do so and perhaps more 
clearly define those limits for Congress and the lower courts     
2. Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting Targeted Legislation 
In addition to the general restrictions on Congress dictated by separation of 
powers principles, specific constitutional provisions such as the Bill of Attainder, 
Ex Post Facto, and Equal Protections Clauses prohibit Congress from singling 
out individuals for disfavored treatment in a pending case.192 These provisions 
serve as an additional bulwark against targeted legislation, and they provide 
another source of authority under which courts can strike down such legislation.  
Because their application is narrow, however, they would likely have only a 
minimal role in policing congressional responses to judicial referrals.    
a. The Constitution specifically prohibits Congress and the states from 
passing a bill of attainder,193 defined as “a law that legislatively determines guilt 
and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the 
protections of a judicial trial.”194 This provision, along with the Ex Post Facto 
clause, serves to protect individuals from the misuse of legislative power and is 
often cited in support of the separation of powers principle that Congress should 
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not stand as judge in individual cases.195 As the Supreme Court declared in 
United States v. Brown, the “Bill of Attainder Clause was intended . . . as an 
implementation of the separation of power, a general safeguard against 
legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply – trial by 
legislature.”196 
The Supreme Court has interpreted these prohibitions narrowly, however.  
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,197 the Court addressed former 
President Nixon’s bill of attainder challenge to the Presidential Recordings and 
Materials Preservation Act.  Although the Act applied only to Nixon, establishing 
special burdens that only he had to bear, the Court upheld it because “the mere 
specificity of law does not call into play the Bill of Attainder Clause.”  The 
special circumstances of the storage of Nixon’s presidential papers justified 
Congress’s creation of a “legitimate class of one,” and so the Act’s singling out 
of Nixon for special treatment was not a violation of the Clause.  Moreover, even 
if the Act’s specificity had triggered the Bill of Attainder Clause’s application, 
the Court concluded that Congress had not “inflicted punishment” on Nixon 
simply by burdening him with obligations under the Act.198 
The Court contrasted the Act at issue in Nixon with the one struck down in 
United States v. Lovett, where a House Report expressly characterized the named 
individuals as “‘subversive . . . and. . . unfit . . . to continue in Government 
employment.’”199 Although a formal legislative condemnation of specific people 
is not a prerequisite to finding a law an unconstitutional bill of attainder, there 
must be some evidence of legislative intent to penalize the individual affected.  
The Court concluded that such evidence of legislative malice went to the heart of 
the Constitution’s bill of attainder prohibition, which arose from “the fear that the 
legislature, in seeking to pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it 
expedient openly to assume the mantle of judge or, worse still, lynch mob.”200 
As Nixon and Lovett demonstrate, only in fairly extreme circumstances will 
laws be struck down as unconstitutional bills of attainder.  Even legislation that 
imposes special burdens on named individuals will not be invalidated unless 
there is evidence of a clear congressional intent to judge and punish.  
Accordingly, even though the Bill of Attainder Clause serves as some measure of 
protection against targeted legislation, it applies only in fairly extreme cases of 
congressional malice toward an identified few. 
b.  The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits Congress from enacting laws that 
retroactively impose punishment by changing the criminal legal consequences of 
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completed acts.201 “Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is . . . the 
lack of fair notice and government restraint when the legislature increases 
punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.”202 
Like the Bill of Attainder Clause, it applies only to laws that penalize, and 
prevents legislatures from criminalizing previously innocent acts.203 
Retroactive changes to procedures at criminal trials, or to civil penalties, are not 
violations of this limitation on Congress’s power to legislate.  So, for example, 
the Court held that the Clause did not bar a state from passing legislation civilly 
committing sex offenders who had completed their prison sentences.204 
c.  The equal protection clause also prohibits Congress from targeting 
individuals for disfavored treatment.  A legislative classification will be upheld 
as long as it is supported by some rational basis, but that basis cannot include an 
animus toward one person, or even a small group of individuals.  As the Supreme 
Court declared, “if the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ 
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government 
interest.”205 Thus, the equal protection clause serves as a slightly broader textual 
prohibition against legislation singling out specific individuals or groups for 
special treatment.206 
Conclusion 
 The trio of constitutional provisions discussed above seek to protect 
individuals from becoming the targets of legislative penalties.  But their scope is 
narrow, and they are decisive only in the most extreme cases of legislative 
animus.  Perhaps they are most useful for the way in which they support and 
establish the vague ideas discussed but not resolved in Klein – whatever it is 
Congress is allowed to do, it must legislate broadly enough to avoid the charge 
that it has sought to punish a specific few.   
These limits provide some parameters that courts can use to police 
Congress’s response to a certified question.  If Congress seeks to control the 
results in the pending case rather than clarify the law for all current and future 
litigants, courts can disregard the legislation as either a violation of one of these 
specific constitutional provisions, or more generally as an overstepping of 
legislative authority and an impermissible intrusion into the judicial power to 
decide specific cases. 
D. Limits on Retroactive Legislation 
If courts were permitted to certify questions to Congress, they would have to 
grapple with the extent to which a congressional response to a certified question 
would be applied retroactively to pending cases.  One of the theories underlying 
the proposal is that Congress is more likely to respond to a judicial inquiry about 
statutory meaning when it knows it can change the result in all pending cases.  
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Sometimes, this might require that Congress’s legislation be given retroactive 
effect.   
The Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses, together with the Due 
Process Clause, suggest that there are constitutional limits on the retroactive 
effect of legislation.207 “‘Retroactivity is not favored in the law,’” and thus the 
default rule is that “‘congressional enactments and administrative rules will not 
be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this 
result.’”208 
The presumption against retroactivity is in tension, however, with the rule 
established in Schooner Peggy that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time 
it renders its decision.209 In Landgraf v. USI Film Products,210 the Supreme 
Court attempted to reconcile these potentially conflicting doctrines.  Landgraf 
reaffirmed that congressional intent is the touchstone.  If Congress makes clear it 
wants legislation to be applied retroactively, then the Court is required to apply 
the law to pending cases.  If the statute contains no express statement about its 
application, then the court must determine whether the statute has retroactive 
effect – that is, “whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, 
increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to 
transactions already completed.”211 Determining whether a law operates 
retroactively is often a difficult question, and it requires that judges decide 
whether there was fair notice, reliance on old law, or disruption of settled 
expectations.212 If the law does have retroactive effect, then it should not be 
applied to pending cases, but all other new legislation should – even in cases that 
have been adjudicated in the lower courts under the old legal standards.   
Ideally Congress would respond to a certified question by clearly specifying 
if it wishes the clarifying legislation to be applied retroactively.  Certified 
questions from courts create an unusual situation, however, in which a court is 
asking Congress to clarify an existing law to assist the court in deciding a 
pending case.  Accordingly, Congress has reason to presume that its response 
will be applied retroactively, and any legislative amendment it enacts in response 
is intended to have retroactive effect.    
That was the conclusion reached by the California Supreme Court in 
Western Security Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court.213 Shortly after that court had 
granted review, the California Legislature passed legislation for the explicit 
purpose of “’clarify[ing] the law’” at issue in the case and overturning the court 
of appeal’s decision.214 The California Supreme Court then had to determine 
whether the new legislation constituted a “substantial change in existing law,” 
and, if so, whether the Legislature intended the statute to operate retroactively.215 
That court concluded that the legislature’s statement that it intends an 
amendment to “clarify” an existing law is equivalent to a statement that it intends 
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the amendment to be given retroactive effect.216 Because statutes will be applied 
retroactively upon a clear statement of legislative intent, every law explicitly 
enacted to “clarify” existing law should be applied retroactively, whether or not 
the court thinks it accurate to describe the amendment as a clarification.  
Likewise, when a court stays a case and seeks congressional clarification of 
ambiguous legislation, it would be reasonable to presume that Congress intends 
its response to apply to that case and other cases – that is, to have retroactive 
effect.217 
In rare cases, constitutional limits will require that the court disregard even 
an explicit instruction by Congress to apply a law retroactively.  Retroactive 
legislation may violate due process “if it is particularly harsh and oppressive,”218 
and legislation that purports to free the government from previous contractual 
commitments is particularly suspect.  But the Due Process Clause forecloses 
retroactive legislation only in the most extreme cases, for as the Court explained 
in Landgraft, “the constitutional impediments to retroactive legislation are now 
modest.”  There are few constitutional hurdles, then, to incorporating Congress’s 
response to a certified question into the resolution of pending cases. 
Furthermore, it would be difficult for congressional clarification of an 
ambiguous statute to disrupt settled expectations so as to implicate due process or 
even to raise the fairness concerns that troubled the Court in Landgraf. If a 
statute is so unclear that numerous courts have disagreed as to its meaning and 
there truly is no way to determine what the original Congress intended, then 
individuals had no reason to rely on one particular interpretation of the statute 
over another.  Could the plaintiff in Graham County have been counting on the 
statute having a six-year statute of limitations when the statute itself was so 
muddled on that question?  Could the school board in Jackson have assumed that 
it could retaliate against the basketball coach without fear that it would violate 
Title IX, despite the conflicting precedent on that question?  It is hard to imagine 
any individual relying on an understanding of the law that neither the text nor 
legal precedent clearly supports.  In short, if the law is unclear enough to justify 
certifying a question to Congress, it cannot have created the kind of reliance 
interests that the presumption against retroactivity seeks to protect.     
E. Judicial Authority to Abstain. 
To give Congress a chance to respond, a court certifying a question about 
the meaning of an ambiguous statute to Congress would need to stay the case in 
which the question arose for some set period of time – perhaps for no more than 
six months, with the possibility for extension if Congress appears to be on the 
verge of taking action.  This judicial abstention might be challenged on the 
ground that courts have no constitutional authority to forgo the exercise of their 
jurisdiction.  Federal courts are obligated to resolve the cases or controversies 
over which Congress grants them jurisdiction; they are not supposed to evade 
that task by asking some other government institution to resolve cases for them.  
Professor Martin Redish made that point in his article challenging the judicial 
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practice of abstaining from deciding difficult questions of state law to allow state 
courts to resolve the issue first.219 He argued that courts may not evade their 
obligation to assume jurisdiction and decide cases simply because, in their view, 
federalism and comity concerns make remand to state courts the wiser course of 
action.  Yet despite the strength of this criticism, courts continued to abstain 
under the Pullman and Younger line of cases – even when it means depriving 
litigants of the federal forum that Congress intended to provide.220 
Certifying questions to Congress is no more an evasion of the judicial 
obligation to hear and decide cases than abstaining to allow state court resolution 
of questions of state law, and thus no more constitutionally objectionable.  In any 
case, the delay is considerably shorter than the average six-year delay in cases 
remanded to state courts for resolution, and would be more akin to the delay 
involved in certifying questions to state supreme courts.  Although courts have an 
obligation to hear the cases over which Congress grants them jurisdiction, they 
are not required by statute or the Constitution to hear and resolve those cases 
within any set period of time.  A six month delay seems like a small price to pay 
to definitively resolve a troubling issue of statutory interpretation.  And, of 
course, if Congress itself were to enact a law permitting courts to send it 
questions in pending cases, then there could be no complaint that the court’s 
staying of the litigation was in any way an evasion of its congressionally 
mandated jurisdiction.  
Conclusion 
The discussion in this Part demonstrates that certifying questions to 
Congress raises significant separation of powers concerns and could impinge on 
individual rights protected by other constitutional provisions, yet also reveals that 
these problems occur only at the margins, and that the Constitution does not 
prohibit all judicial attempts to seek congressional input on pending cases.  
Accordingly, certification must be structured to comply with constitutional 
limitations.  The guidelines below provide general principles for a certification 
process that take into account these constitutional problems and seek to insulate it 
from constitutional challenge:   
1)  Referrals must be discretionary:  Courts must never be required to refer 
cases, and Congress must never be required to respond. 
2)  To be given any legal weight, Congress’s response must be in the form 
of law enacted in accordance with Article I’s bicameralism and presentment 
requirements.  
3) Congress must respond through broadly applicable legislation, rather than 
by enacting a statute that seeks to control the result in only a handful of cases. 
4)  Congress should specify whether it wants the amended legislation to 
apply retroactively to pending cases, although courts would probably be safe to 
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assume that Congress intended any response to a referral to be applied 
retroactively. 
5) Congress should pass, and the president should sign, a law permitting 
courts to certify questions to Congress so that when a court refers a case all three 
branches of government have given the procedure their imprimatur.   
If a certification process followed these broad principles, it should pass 
constitutional muster.  Whether adopting such a procedure would be a good 
policy choice is a harder question to answer, however.  Satisfying constitutional 
minimums is a necessary prerequisite to adopting a certification procedure, but is 
certainly not sufficient reason on its own to establish a formal structure through 
which courts ask Congress to weigh in on pending cases.  Moreover, even if 
certification can be shaped to fit within constitutional parameters, it comes close 
to certain constitutional lines that we might think better to give wide berth.  Part 
IV examines these normative questions and draws conclusion about the kinds of 
cases in which certification would be a useful tool for courts, and those for which 
the delays and the potential for abuse of the legislative process would outweigh 
the benefits.  
IV. Certifying Questions to Congress:  A Policy Analysis. 
 The constitutional analysis in Part III suggests that certification is less 
radical than it might first appear.  Yet is it wise?  A formal system by which 
courts seek congressional input would give courts and Congress an opportunity 
to communicate about the cases in which legislative assistance would be most 
useful.  But when courts stay cases and notify Congress that they are seeking 
clarifying legislation, they push Congress to take a more active, and possibly 
troubling, role in pending cases.  If we are concerned that Congress may act 
irresponsibly when faced with an unpopular litigant, or that Congress may not 
enact its best legislation in the shadow of the facts of specific cases, then we may 
question whether Congress should be given this opportunity. 
This Part first discusses in greater detail the policy arguments for and 
against establishing a procedure by which courts send questions to Congress, 
using the three recent Supreme Court cases discussed in Part I – Jackson v. 
Birmingham Board of Education, Graham County Soil & Water Conservation 
District v. United States ex rel. Wilson, and Clark v. Martinez – to illustrate the 
possibilities and pitfalls of sending questions about statutory meaning to 
Congress.  This Part then addresses the very real possibility that Congress would 
often not respond to a court’s request for a clarification of legislative meaning.  
Congressional silence need not be viewed as a failure of the certification process, 
however, because Congress’s refusal to clarify legislation can be understood as 
an implicit delegation to courts of the lawmaking authority that they otherwise 
lack.  If courts ask for Congress’s input and receive no answer, they can then 
legitimately engage in lawmaking that they should otherwise avoid.  This Part 
concludes by identifying the types of hard cases in which judicial referrals would 
assist judges grappling with the meaning of ambiguous statutes. 
A. The Benefits of Certifying Questions to Congress. 
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1. Improving Interbranch Communication 
 Referrals would provide a new avenue of communication between courts 
and Congress, and would do so in a manner likely to draw congressional 
attention to problem statutes and generate legislation to resolve those problems.   
 Judges, members of Congress, and academics all agree that the judiciary and 
Congress do not communicate well.  As Judge James L. Buckley of the D.C. 
Circuit commented:  “It is self-evident that these two institutions will impact on 
one another in a dozen different ways.  Yet, for whatever strange reason, each 
institution tends to be miserably unacquainted with the problems faced by the 
other.”221 Judge Frank M. Coffin, when serving as Chair of the U.S. Judicial 
Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch, observed that “the judiciary and 
Congress not only do not communicate with each other on their most basic 
concerns; they do not know how they may properly do so.”222 Studies reveal that 
neither members of Congress nor their staffs are cognizant of the great majority 
of judicial decisions addressing legislation within the jurisdiction of their 
committees.223
In the mid-1980s, Robert Katzmann – now a Second Circuit Judge, but at 
that time head of a non-profit organization engaged in examining relations 
between Congress and the Judiciary – began studying the interaction between the 
D.C. Circuit and Congress, focusing on how Congress responded to D.C. Circuit 
opinions discussing problems with statutory language.224 He examined twenty 
cases in which the D.C. Circuit had issued opinions that commented on a 
statutory gap, ambiguous language, a grammatical problem, or invited Congress 
to deal with a substantive issue in the legislation.  He then contacted staff 
members at the relevant House committees and discovered that in most cases the 
congressional staffs were unaware of the court’s decisions.225 Yet there is 
general agreement that Congress would craft better statutes if judicial decisions 
addressing legislative problems were brought to staff members’ attention.  
Indeed, every staffer interviewed by Katzmann thought that they should be aware 
of these judicial decisions so that they could consider whether statutory revisions 
were necessary.226 
Certifying questions to Congress in pending cases is likely to capture 
Congress’s attention and perhaps even spur Congress to take immediate action to 
improve problem legislation before a court issues a definitive decision on the 
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issue. But even if Congress never responds to the judicial query, some 
members of Congress and their staffs will be put on notice that a piece of 
legislation is posing interpretive challenges.  The communication from the court 
will provide useful information to Congress about the issues courts grapple with 
in interpreting and applying legislation, and may improve legislative drafting as a 
result.  At the very least, then, referrals will make Congress aware of the problem 
of statutory gaps or ambiguities, enabling Congress to avoid repeating those 
drafting errors in future legislation.227 
Suppose, for example, that rather than issuing an opinion in Graham 
County, the Supreme Court instead asked Congress to clarify the limitations 
period for retaliation claims in the False Claims Act.  The absence of a clear 
statute of limitations appears to have been an oversight; when Congress amended 
the False Claims Act to add retaliation it seems to have forgotten to establish a 
limitations period to govern that claim.  Nor is this the first time Congress has 
failed to clarify the limitations periods in legislation establishing new causes of 
action.  Once the error was brought to Congress’s attention, it is possible that 
Congress could act quickly to establish a limitations period to govern the dispute 
in  Graham County and all future cases.  Even if Congress did not resolve the 
question, forcing the Court to decide the case on its own, the certification might 
alert Congress to the need to specify limitations periods when adding claims to 
existing statutes in the future. 
 2. Reducing Interbranch Conflict 
Referring questions of statutory ambiguity to Congress has the potential to 
reduce interbranch conflict.  Courts are more easily accused of “legislating from 
the bench” when they are filling gaps or finding meaning where, in truth, none 
exists.228 Members of Congress are more likely to criticize courts when they see 
judges interpreting ambiguous statutes in ways that they would not.229 The 
tension between the judicial and legislative branches is at its zenith when a court 
concludes that a statute is unconstitutional and strikes it down.   
 Some of these problems could be avoided if Congress clarified ambiguous 
statutes in response to certified questions from courts, thereby obviating the need 
for the court to engage in quasi-legislative activity.  The more important the 
question of statutory meaning, the more likely Congress is to take up the question 
and resolve it for the court.  Consequently, divisive questions of statutory 
meaning – such as whether Congress intended to create an implied private right 
of action or to allow for the indefinite detention of deportable aliens – would no 
longer be subjects that the judiciary is forced to decide on its own.  
 Admittedly, courts might send questions to Congress that are so 
controversial that Congress would prefer to punt the issue back to the judicial 
branch.  For example, members of Congress might not want to make a decision 
about whether a retaliation claim can be brought under Title IX, or the length of 
time an alien can be detained under the Immigration and Nationality Act, out of 
fear of alienating some part of their constituencies.  Conversely, some referrals 
might concern minor or technical questions of statutory meaning – such as the 
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limitations period under the False Claims Act – that Congress simply does not 
have the time to address.  But even when Congress does not respond to a judicial 
inquiry, courts will forestall criticism by first seeking congressional input.  If a 
court asked Congress to resolve the issue and Congress never responded, then the 
court cannot be blamed for filling in gaps or assigning meaning to unclear 
language that Congress failed to fix.  By making a good faith effort to obtain a 
resolution of the problem through the political branches, the court will insulate 
itself from attacks of activism. 
 Referrals to Congress would be particularly helpful in avoiding the 
interbranch conflict that arises whenever the judiciary confronts an ambiguous 
statute raising constitutional concerns.  Because the court is being asked to strike 
down legislation enacted by a co-equal branch of government, these cases pit the 
judicial and legislative branches against one another.  The courts’ current method 
of dealing with this problem is to construe the language to avoid the 
constitutional question230 – a practice that Alexander Bickel referred as one of the 
“passive virtues” that encourages Congress to give a “second look” to problem 
legislation.231 Only when Congress makes crystal clear its intent to push the 
constitutional limits will courts have to address the question whether the statute is 
unconstitutional, and perhaps take the ultimate step of striking down the 
legislation.  In other words, courts use this interpretative technique as a method 
of side-stepping a clash with Congress.   
 Yet, as wasdiscussed in Part I, the constitutional avoidance doctrine itself 
has been criticized as an example of judicial overreaching.232 Commentators 
question whether courts have the right to refuse to apply statutes as they can most 
logically be read without definitively deciding whether that construction would 
be unconstitutional.  By purposely skewing the meaning of statutes without first 
addressing whether the more straightforward reading is unconstitutional, critics 
contend that courts are essentially rewriting laws even when the Constitution 
might not require it –something that courts have no authority to do.233 
Sending questions about statutory meaning to Congress is a better method of 
addressing ambiguous statutes that push constitutional limits.  These certified 
questions would give Congress the opportunity to decide whether it wishes to 
tread near constitutional lines before the court rewrites the statute.234 Courts 
would not have to distort the meaning of statutes to avoid a constitutional 
problem that they might eventually conclude did not exist in any case.  For its 
part, Congress might wisely decide to amend the statute to avoid the 
constitutional problems that concern the court, thereby circumventing a 
constitutional showdown.  Congress, not the courts, should be responsible for 
“clarifying” statutory meaning to avoid constitutional issues – certifying 
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75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) 
232 See discussion supra notes __ to __. 
233 Id.   
234 Again, parallels can be drawn to the doctrines of certification and abstention to 
resolve hard questions of state law; avoiding constitutional questions is one of the 
primary purposes of Pullman abstention.  See Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman 
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (abstention permits court to “avoid . . . the friction of a 
premature constitutional adjudication”); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 490 (1949). 
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questions about the meaning of ambiguous and constitutionally-suspect statutes 
to Congress allows Congress to take on that role. 
 Were certification available, the Court could have granted the petition in 
Clark v. Martinez – or, even better, in its precursor Zadvydas v. Davis – and then 
stayed the case and asked Congress to establish a clear limit on the length of time 
that aliens could be detained.  Certification would have allowed the Court to 
avoid the constitutional problem created by a statute that appeared to permit 
indefinite detention.  The judicial query would have notified Congress of the 
ambiguity in the statute and at the same time alerted Congress of the Court’s 
constitutional concerns.  Congress might have reacted by enacting legislation that 
clearly stated the permissible length of detention in most cases, clarified whether 
that period applied to admitted and inadmissible aliens alike, and provided 
grounds for extending detention under certain extraordinary circumstances.  
Alternatively, if Congress had responded with legislation clearly permitting 
indefinite detention, then the Court could have squarely addressed the 
constitutional question presented by the statute. 
 As this example illustrates, certification puts the burden of avoiding the 
constitutional showdown on Congress, not the courts.  If Congress chooses to 
force the question, then the Supreme Court would decide whether the statute 
comports with the Constitution – a task for which the Court is well-suited.  
Because certification was not an option in Zadvydas or Clark, however, the Court 
grafted onto the Immigration and Nationality Act a six-month detention period 
for both admitted and inadmissible aliens and made vague references to 
circumstances that might justify extending that detention – all decisions that 
seem better made by Congress in the first instance than by a court.   
3. Making the Best Use of Courts’ and Congress’s Institutional 
Competences 
 Judicial referrals of ambiguous statutes to Congress would free courts from 
filling gaps and reconciling inconsistencies in statutory language – functions that 
the judiciary is comparatively less well-situated to perform than Congress.  
Congress has the staff and the resources to investigate problems that need 
legislative fixes, and then to deliberate about the best policy to be enacted into 
law.  Members of Congress represent constituencies with whom they remain in 
close contact, and thus have a view of the interests and problems of those they 
represent.  Judges, on the other hand, cannot investigate policy choices because 
they do not have the resources or authority to conduct hearings, nor do they have 
a constituency to consult or to whom they are accountable.  To the contrary, the 
defining characteristics of the federal judiciary is that its members have life 
tenure and salary protections that enable them to protect individual rights and 
apply laws fairly and consistently to all members of the population, even when 
doing so is politically unpopular.  For all these reasons, Congress is the better 
institution to draft laws, and the judiciary is the better institution to apply them.235 
Yet when Congress enacts statutes that are unclear, or contain gaps or 
inconsistencies, then courts are required to get into the business of making, rather 
than interpreting, the law.236 For example, when the Supreme Court decides that 
 
235 See supra notes __ to __.     
236 The line between judicial lawmaking and statutory interpretation is not always clear, 
of course, and so determining whether a judicial decision has gone beyond law-
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Title IX creates a cause of action for retaliation (as it did in Jackson), or assigns a 
state statute of limitations to claims brought under the False Claims Act (as it did 
in Graham County), or determines how long deportable aliens may be detained 
(as it did in Zadvydas and Clark), it is acting more like a legislature than a court.  
Courts are unlikely to do as good a job as Congress could in making these policy 
choices because they lack all the resources and information that Congress has as 
its disposal.  These cases force courts to go beyond interpretation, a task for 
which they are well-suited, and engage in law-making, for which they are not. 
 Furthermore, Courts are accused of judicial activism when they make these 
sorts of substantive policy decisions because their critics fail to recognize that 
when statutes leave important questions unanswered – as did Title IX, the False 
Claims Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act – courts have to reach some 
conclusion about how the statute should be applied, and any decision forces 
courts into the position of legislating rather than interpreting.  In other words, 
judges cannot avoid being activists when faced with ambiguous statutes that must 
be applied to the case at hand.  Instead of being criticized for making these hard 
decisions, courts should be given the alternative of referring questions of 
statutory ambiguity back to Congress so that Congress can assume the 
lawmaking responsibility for which it, and not the judiciary, is best suited. 
 4. Promoting Transparency  
 Certifying questions to Congress provides a more straightforward method of 
dealing with statutory ambiguity than the hermeneutic theories and canons of 
construction that courts normally employ.  The latter techniques simply cannot 
resolve every statutory interpretation problem.237 As discussed in Part I, there are 
times when Congress has not foreseen the situation presented to the court, or 
perhaps deliberately chosen to leave an issue unclear, and thus neither the 
statutory text nor the legislative history can guide the court’s construction.  In 
such cases, courts generally make up an answer in the guise of “interpreting” the 
statute, often bending or breaking traditional interpretive tools to do so.238 On 
other occasions, courts will misuse these techniques to avoid constitutionally 
troubling or obviously unfair outcomes.  For the most part, judges are not fooling 
anyone when they do so – indeed, judges are often accused of imposing their 
own policy preferences while purporting to “interpret” statutes.239 Even those 
who approve the results in such cases contend that courts are perverting 
important tools of statutory construction by suggesting that the meanings they 
arrive at are compelled by these interpretive techniques.   
 By sending an ambiguous statute to Congress for clarification, a court is 
declaring that it can find no answer to the question in the case before it through 
traditional hermeneutic inquiries, and that it thinks the issue is better addressed in 
the first instance by the political branches.  As a result, the canons of statutory 
interpretation and other hermeneutic techniques will not be devalued by being 
 
interpretation to law-creation is usually a matter of debate.  See Daniel J. Meltzer, 
Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1901 n.61 (2004).   
237 See, e.g., Maggs, supra note __, at 137 (“Statutory interpretation, however, can only 
do so much.  Once an ambiguity enters a statute, a court may never resolve it perfectly.  
Lawyers argue about many issues.  Lawyers argue about many issues not because they 
disagree about how to interpret statutes in general, but because at bottom, the issues have 
no clear answer under any method of interpretation.”). 
238 See supra notes __ to __.  
239 See supra notes __ to __. 
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pressed into use in such cases, and the court will be more honest with itself, the 
parties, the public, and Congress if it concedes the impossibility of the 
interpretive task and asks Congress for assistance.  
 In Jackson, Graham County, and Clark, the majority and dissent reached the 
opposite conclusions about meaning of the statutes at issue after engaging in a 
careful parsing of the text, examination of legislative history, and application of 
interpretive theories and canons of construction.240 A review of those decisions 
leaves the reader unconvinced that there was any “answer” to be found using 
those sources.  A more honest approach would have been for the Court to throw 
up its hands, declare the impossibility of the task, and seek congressional 
assistance.  
 Moreover, the possibility of judicial certification may keep Congress more 
honest and transparent when enacting legislation.  Legislators sometimes 
consciously choose ambiguity to mask their goals, or to be able to claim to 
constituents that they accomplished something they did not, or to build majority 
support for legislation that would otherwise fail to be enacted into law.241 When 
courts are honest about ambiguity, they identify that the problem is the 
legislature’s drafting of the original statute, rather than judicial failure to find and 
apply politically neutral and effective techniques of statutory interpretation.  By 
bringing the problem back to Congress’s attention, legislators will either have to 
face up to the hard choices required of them, or, through silence, concede that 
they are unwilling to make legislation clear.  In addition, the potential for 
referrals back to Congress may inspire the legislature to be clearer in the first 
instance – in part, because referrals will draw their attention to drafting problems 
they will seek to avoid in the future, and in part because the enacting Congress 
would rather retain control of the statute’s meaning than cede that task to 
whichever future Congress receives the referral. 
5. Promoting Democracy 
 Certifying questions about statutory meaning to Congress is more consistent 
with democratic ideals than the current practice, which transforms judges into 
legislators whenever Congress enacts ambiguous statutes.  Instead of an 
unelected judge simply drafting the missing language or altering the meaning of 
words to undo an absurdity or inconsistency, elected members of Congress get to 
take the first shot at clarifying statutory meaning.   
 Although Congress now has the option of overriding judicial interpretations 
that it does not like – and, as Eskridge demonstrated,242 Congress sometimes 
chooses that path – legislative overrides are not a failsafe method for ensuring 
that elected branches have the last say about a law’s meaning.  Congress might 
not be able to override a judicial interpretation even when that interpretation is 
contrary to the original intent of the enacting legislators and is disliked by the 
majority of current legislators.  As scholars of the legislative process have 
explained, judicial decisions are hard to reverse because if even a small 
 
240 See supra notes __ to __. 
241 Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note __; Maggs, supra note __, at 132 (“To avoid 
controversy, for instance, lawmakers may choose to leave key issues unresolved in the 
hopes that the judiciary will supply an answer and absorbe the political consequences.”); 
Federal Courts Study Committee, Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the 
Federal Courts Study Committee 90 (1990) (“Some statutory ambiguities are, of course, 
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242 Eskridge, Overriding, supra note __. 
Certifying Questions to Congress 49
 
proportion of the original legislative coalition prefers the court’s reading of the 
statute to the legislative agreement, and if those lost votes cannot be replaced 
with legislators who were originally opposed to the statute, then the judicial 
ruling will stand.243 The court’s opinion declaring the meaning of the statute will 
change the default position and create new stakeholders who are happy with the 
court’s view of the law, inhibiting the legislature’s ability to enact a statute to 
reestablish the original understanding of the legislation.   
 For example, a majority of those members of Congress that supported 
adding retaliation to the False Claims Act might have preferred a six year statute 
of limitations for that claim.  But the Court has now read the Act as containing no 
statute of limitations for retaliation claims, and has thus indicated that the likely 
statute of limitations to be applied would be the 3-year period provided by the 
most closely analogous state law.244 Those members of Congress who were 
opposed adding a retaliation claim will obviously prefer this shorter period, as 
might some members who supported the addition of the retaliation claim but 
preferred a shorter limitations period.  Together, this new coalition could prevent 
an amendment that would override the Court’s interpretation and establish a six-
year statute of limitations.   
 In contrast, when a court certifies questions about statutory meaning to 
Congress, it encourages Congress to legislate before the court issues an opinion, 
leading to statutes that are drafted as a majority of elected members of Congress 
prefer rather than as unelected judges choose to interpret them.  Congress will be 
inspired to enact clarifying legislation because it knows that if it does not, the 
court will be forced to decide the question for it.  Because legislators cannot 
know how a court would decide the case without their assistance, they will be 
able to enact clarifying legislation free from a judicial interpretation that skews 
legislative coalitions. 
 Certifying questions to Congress accomplishes many of the same goals 
lauded by dynamic statutory theorists, who recommend interpreting ambiguous 
statutes in light of current congressional preferences and social norms rather than 
looking backward to glean the intent of the enacting legislature.245 Critics of this 
school of interpretive thought claim that it poses an impossible task – however 
are judges supposed to determine the preferences of legislators and/or the general 
public? – and so they suggest that dynamic theorists are really just empowering 
judges to craft new legislation in accord with their own policy preferences.246 
Certifying questions to Congress realizes the dynamic theorists’ goals, but does 
so in a way that should satisfy these critics.  Courts would no longer be trying to 
guess at current legislative preferences, but instead would be asking for a clear 
statement from the current Congress about how the interpretive problem should 
be resolved.  If Congress does not respond, however, then Courts have a 
newfound freedom through the implicit delegation of legislative power to engage 
in lawmaking that would otherwise be Congress’s prerogative.247 
243 Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy:  Administrative Arrangements and Political Control of Agencies, 75 
VA. L. REV. 431, 444, 437-42 (1989) (“[E]x post reestablishment of a coalitional 
agreement, after a judicial opinion has upset the status quo, is likely to be difficult.”). 
244 125 S. Ct. at 2453. 
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B. The Costs of Certifying Questions to Congress. 
 Certification does not come without costs.  Certification will cause delays. It 
may politicize the judicial process.  It may produce ill-considered and hastily 
drafted legislation, or legislation driven by base majority preferences or the 
desire the please narrow interest groups.  For these reasons, I advocate that only 
the Supreme Court, and possibly also circuit courts acting en banc, be given the 
authority to certify questions to Congress, and that these courts use this tool only 
in cases of truly intractable statutory ambiguity where it appears that Congress 
will do a better job of legislating a solution than can a court. 
1.  Delay 
 Without question, certification to Congress will delay resolution of cases in 
which the procedure is used.  If Congress does not respond to the referral, the 
delay should be six months or less because the court should not abstain for any 
longer if there is no indication that Congress intends to clarify the legislative 
ambiguity.  If a bill to amend the statute is proposed and starts working its way 
through the committee process, however, then the delay could end up being two 
years or more to allow for the kind of deliberation the legislative process often 
demands.248 This additional time is significant, and rightfully a reason for courts 
not to certify questions lightly. 
 But delay is not a reason to reject judicial referrals to Congress out of hand.  
The use of abstention and certification seek state court views on state law also 
slows down the judicial process – in the case of abstention, by an average of six 
years249 – and yet the consensus is that the benefit of obtaining state court input 
justifies the added time it takes to decide the case.250 The delay is considered 
worthwhile because these procedural devices give the ultimate, authoritative 
decision-maker the first chance to answer hard questions about statutory meaning 
– potentially even saving time in the long run by avoiding the need for a state 
court to override a federal court’s decision about state law.  For the same reasons, 
the delay caused by referring questions of statutory ambiguity to Congress is 
justified.  Better to have Congress make clear how it wants the statute to be 
applied than leave a federal court to guess at the meaning in an unclear text, and 
then be overridden by a dissatisfied Congress.   
 Even though a referral to Congress postpones the resolution of a single case, 
referrals have the potential to increase the overall speed of judicial 
decisionmaking.  The referral may inspire Congress to enact a clarifying 
amendment much earlier than it would have if left to address the issue on its own 
 
248 Congress is capable of responding a court’s referral in a reasonable period of time.  
Even without the pressure of a pending case to resolve, “Congress tends to respond to 
appeals court statutory decisions with alacrity.”  Lindquist & Yalof, supra note __, at 65.  
Lindquist and Yalof’s study determined that almost 50 percent of all congressional 
initiatives to override statutory decisions were reported out of committee within two 
years of the court’s decision.  Id. Certainly, two years is a significant amount of time, but 
it is far less than the average six year wait that accompanies the process of abstaining 
while the parties wend their way through the state court systems.  In any case, one hopes 
that Congress could and would act more quickly when a court has stayed a pending case 
for the purpose of obtaining legislative clarification. 
249 FALLON, HART & WECHSLER’S, supra note __, at 1198. 
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timetable.  In law, certainty and finality are beneficial.251 The sooner Congress 
clarifies an unclear statute, the more quickly and easily courts can resolve all 
current and future cases concerning that issue.  Indeed, some cases will never be 
filed simply because there is no longer any debate about what the law means.252
So even though a decision in a specific case will be delayed, the legal system as a 
whole will operate more efficiently.    
 Finally, Congress can find methods to reduce the time it takes to respond to 
referrals about the most basic type of scrivener’s errors and similarly 
uncontroversial clarifications to statutory text.  Congress can expedite the 
enactment of corrective legislation through procedures such as suspension of the 
rules or proceeding under unanimous consent.253 Even without those special 
procedures, one long-time judicial staff member explained that “when most 
everyone [in Congress] agrees to do something, legislation can be passed in a 
matter of days.”254 
Because delays are a legitimate concern, however, only a limited number of 
courts should have the power to certify questions to Congress, and they should 
use that power only when presented with truly inscrutable statutes.  Questions 
about statutory meaning should not be sent to Congress unless there has been 
significant judicial disagreement over the text at issue culminating in the kind of 
deep circuit split that the Supreme Court itself requires before it will hear most 
cases.  I recommend that the authority to certify questions to Congress be limited 
to the Supreme Court and perhaps also circuit courts acting en banc. A single 
district court, or even a single panel of three appellate judges, should not have the 
power to defer the resolution of disputes for the purpose of seeking congressional 
input.  With such limits in place, certification should be an infrequent occurrence, 
and should arise only in the kinds of cases presenting intractable problems of 
statutory interpretation in which the benefits of certification outweigh the costs. 
 2. Politicizing the Judicial Process 
 As previously discussed, certifying questions about statutory meaning to 
Congress is democracy-forcing because it provides an additional opportunity for 
the members of the elected, politically-accountable branches of government to be 
clear about the meaning of the laws they enact.255 The other side of the coin is 
that transferring issues in pending cases to the halls of Congress will politicize 
the judicial process.  At least in theory – though admittedly not always in practice 
– courts are the one forum in which the political power of the parties is irrelevant.  
 
251 Cf. Friendly, supra note __, at 793 n.39 (noting that legislative amendments might 
prove troublesome in pending cases, but concluding that “the need for ending the 
uncertainty for the future normally transcends the possibility of adverse decision of cases 
arising in the interim”). 
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But if a case is referred to the political branches for resolution, then the relative 
political power of the parties comes back into play.256 One can reasonably 
suspect that if a question of statutory ambiguity is sent to Congress, the party 
with the most money, connections, and influence will be more likely to persuade 
Congress to “clarify” the ambiguous statute in a way that favors that party and 
their interests.257 
A partial response to this criticism is that certification does not create a new 
problem:  Congress already can alter legislation to change the outcome of 
pending cases, and, as a result, Congress is already heavily lobbied by those who 
fear they might lose in court.258 Admittedly, an established process by which 
courts send questions to Congress would give Congress more notice, opportunity, 
and incentive to take action, and so it would likely increase the parties’ 
opportunities to apply political pressure to obtain the legislation that will allow 
them to win their case.  But these are not grounds for criticizing certification per 
se, but rather are problems that infuse the process of democratic decisionmaking.  
Certification is a more democratic way of resolving statutory ambiguity, and thus 
it will be accompanied by all the downsides of the democratic process, including 
lobbying by special interests.259 
Indeed, certification could be considered a fairer method of notifying 
Congress about problem legislation than the system we have now.  Without 
referrals to Congress, a politically powerful losing party has the incentive and 
ability to get Congress to amend the legislation at issue, but losing parties 
without political influence will very likely be unable to do so.260 In his study of 
the factors leading to congressional overrides of judicial decisions, Eskridge 
discovered that politically powerful losers in court are more likely to persuade 
Congress to override Supreme Court decisions than those who lack access and 
clout.261 Judicial referrals give Congress notice and an opportunity to take action 
when a court decides that congressional input would be helpful, and not just 
when one party has the political muscle to bring the issue to Congress’s attention. 
 Moreover, a closer look at the relative political power of the parties in 
Jackson and Graham County provides some reassurance, because these cases 
demonstrate that even a single plaintiff will be able to call upon influential allies 
should the need to lobby Congress arise.  Both cases were brought by a single, 
 
256 Maria Gabriela Bianchini, The Tobacco Agreement that Went Up in Smoke:  Defining 
the Limits of Congressional Intervention into Ongoing Mass Tort Litigation, 87 Cal. L. 
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relatively powerless plaintiff against an institutional defendant, yet both plaintiffs 
had plenty of amici supporting them who could be expected to join in the 
lobbying effort should there need to be one.262 Nor were the defendants in either 
case (a school board in Jackson and a local government and its officials in 
Graham County) so powerful and connected as to suggest that they would 
inevitably win the day in the halls of Congress – especially considering that the 
United States in both cases supported the plaintiff.  Clark, however, poses a more 
worrisome problem, since it pitted an illegal alien against the executive branch of 
the United States.  The executive always has the inside track in Congress, and 
particularly when the President’s party also controls both Houses of Congress, as 
was the case when Clark was decided.  We might fear the power of the executive 
in a case like Clark to push through Congress a “clarification” that favors 
executive power at the expense of the individual litigant – particularly when the 
litigant is a politically powerless alien.    
 Courts should therefore be circumspect about the cases they refer to 
Congress.  If they believe that one party has much greater political clout that its 
opponent, they should hesitate to send the question about statutory meaning to 
Congress out of fear that Congress will attempt to control the outcome in the 
particular case rather than legislate for the general public good.  If the court is 
concerned that one party will out-lobby the other, or that Congress will be 
tempted to reward or punish the individual litigants in the case before the court, 
then the court should choose not to certify the question in that case.  In addition, 
courts should police the congressional response to a certified question to ensure 
that Congress has not sought to take over the judicial function by controlling 
results in specific cases.  As discussed in Part III, Congress must legislate so as to 
affect more than just the case before the court, which means that Congress should 
take into account the broader public interest rather than just the interests of the 
parties in the pending litigation.  To ensure this result, courts must be vigilant in 
preventing Congress from encroaching on judicial territory by attempting to 
control the outcome of a pending case without effecting a change in the 
underlying legal standards.263 
3. Congress’s Failure to Respond 
 If a certification procedure were established, Congress would likely ignore 
certified questions in a large number of cases, leaving the ambiguous statute to be 
construed and applied by the court.  The reality is that Congress has many 
legislative priorities and may not be interested in expending time, resources, and 
political will on a statute that a court finds confusing.  Consequently, the 
certification process may not accomplish the hoped-for goal of giving the elected 
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branches an opportunity to clarify indeterminate statutes.  Indeed, many of the 
claimed benefits of certification described above would fail to materialize.   
 Yet even assuming Congress would not respond to most judicial queries, the 
very fact that Congress was asked to clarify a statute but did not do so will have 
bearing on the judicial approach to the interpretive problem.  I contend that 
Congress’s failure to assist the court implicitly delegates the lawmaking function 
to the courts, permitting judges to approach the ambiguous statute with greater 
flexibility and creativity and insulating them from charges of judicial activism 
when doing so.   
 Others might object, arguing that congressional silence should not be 
interpreted as giving courts free rein to engage in lawmaking.  Legislative 
inaction is weak evidence of congressional intent.  When a court issues a decision 
interpreting a statute and Congress never amends the statute to undo that court 
decision, should we assume that Congress agrees with the court’s reading of the 
legislation?  What if Congress amends the statute but does not alter the judicial 
construction?  And how about if members of Congress drafted a bill seeking to 
override the judicial construction, but the bill never becomes law?  Courts have 
been inconsistent in their treatment of these different types of legislative inaction, 
sometimes treating congressional silence as a near-dispositive factor and other 
times concluding it has no value whatsoever.264 
The argument in favor of imbuing legislative inaction with legal 
significance is that, at least in some cases, it raises a strong inference that 
Congress approves of the judicial or executive branch’s statutory 
interpretation.265 But as the Court has conceded, “[n]onaction by Congress is not 
often a useful guide.”266 Courts frequently reject legislative acquiescence 
arguments, noting that members of Congress are likely to be unaware of the 
judicial or agency interpretation at issue.267 And even when Congress is 
cognizant of another branch’s reading of a statute, its failure to override that 
interpretation might be due to pressing legislative priorities rather than its 
approval.  As one commentator noted, “[legislative] [a]cquiescence is the rule 
and not the exception, whatever Congress’ feelings about a Supreme Court 
decision.”268 For these reasons, legal scholars have almost uniformly concluded 
 
264 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 67, 69 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction].  
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that acquiescence is not a good indicator of legislative agreement with anything a 
court says.269
Reliance on legislative silence is also criticized as being at odds with the 
democratic process.  Lawmaking should be transparent and produce results for 
which elected officials can be held accountable.  Congressional acquiescence is a 
nonevent that occurs without fanfare or press coverage, permitting legislators to 
avoid responsibility because none will be on record as having voted for another 
branch’s interpretation.  Moreover, giving weight to legislative silence conflicts 
with the constitutionally prescribed roles of the legislative and executive 
branches in our system of government.  Under Article I of the Constitution, 
Congress plays the primary role in enacting legislation, but to do so it is required 
to win approval of both Houses of Congress and the President (or override a 
presidential veto by a two-thirds majority of both Houses).  If a judicial or 
agency interpretation of a statute is viewed as “law” simply because Congress did 
not pass a statute rejecting that interpretation, then congressional inaction can 
bypass the Constitution’s procedural hurdles to enacting legislation, and can 
eliminate the President from the process altogether.  “[I]n view of the specific 
and constitutional procedures required for the enactment of legislation, it would 
seem hardly justifiable to treat as having legislative effect any action or 
nonaction not taken in accordance with the prescribed procedures.”270 
These are powerful criticisms of legislative acquiescence arguments, and 
they have gained ascendancy along with the rise of textualism.  But they do not 
require courts to ignore the significance of congressional silence in the context of 
certification.  Congress’s nonresponse to a judicial query about the meaning of a 
statute should be given legal weight by the certifying court not because it tells 
that court anything about Congress’s view of statutory meaning, but rather 
because it gives the court information about the role Congress is willing to let the 
courts play in statutory interpretation.271 
Normally, the judiciary serves as Congress’s agent by construing the statute 
as instructed.  Textualists believe that Congress can only instruct through 
statutory text while intentionalists are willing to look at legislative history as 
well, but under either theory courts are agents of the legislature.  Dynamic 
theorists such as Elhauge would ask courts to be agents of the current legislature 
by construing the law in the way the current legislature would prefer.  When a 
court refers an issue of statutory ambiguity to Congress, however, it is in essence 
telling Congress that it does not have enough information to serve as a faithful 
agent (either to the enacting legislature or the current legislature), and that it 
cannot do Congress’s bidding without clearer instructions.  Congress’s refusal to 
provide direction in these circumstances has meaning, I argue, because it forces 
the agent (the court) to act without guidance from its principal (Congress).  
Congressional silence lets the court know that it is free to craft its own 
substantive policy where Congress has given the court none to apply.  That is, the 
 
269 See, e.g., id.at 95; Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative 
Intent:  A Venture into ‘Speculative Unrealities,’ 64 B.U. L. REV. 737 (1984); Laurence 
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270 Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22 n.4 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
271 Cf. Nagle, supra note __, at 1317 (“[A]s Congress becomes aware of more alleged 
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agent has free rein to act in accord with its own views rather than those of its 
principal when the principal has been unclear and refuses to give the agent 
further instructions.   
 Significantly, the argument that courts have greater latitude to engage in 
lawmaking when Congress has not responded to a judicial question about 
statutory meaning is based primarily on the legislative action that led to the 
court’s review of the problem legislation. To get to the point where the court 
can, on its own, draft legislation to fill gaps or reconcile inconsistencies, 
Congress had to affirmatively enact legislation:  First, it had to enact the statute 
at issue that the court is now trying to decipher; and second, it had to enact 
legislation giving the federal courts jurisdiction over litigation concerning the 
statute.  It is the combination of a grant of jurisdiction to decide the case, a 
federal statute that the court is required to administer, and Congress’s refusal to 
answer the court’s request to clarify the statute that leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that the court itself must legislate to resolve the ambiguity. 
 Congressional delegation of lawmaking authority, be it implicit or explicit, 
is nothing new.  Courts view Congress as having delegated lawmaking power 
every time they give agencies deference to construe their governing statutes or 
apply one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Federal judges are often 
described as politically unaccountable, but they have at least as much political 
legitimacy as an appointed agency official.  Furthermore, judges often engage in 
lawmaking when they believe Congress has given them that leeway – for 
example, by enacting a broadly-worded statute such as the Sherman Act.272 The 
same rationale supports the federal courts’ authority to craft federal common law 
– an authority that arises from the need to fill interstices in federal statutory 
schemes and the reality that courts are the only federal institution capable, at the 
time the case is before it, of filling those gaps.  So there is nothing shocking 
about the judiciary taking over the lawmaking function when Congress has failed 
to clarify the meaning of the statutory text courts must apply.273 
The proposal here does not require courts to seek congressional input when 
acting to flesh out the meaning of broadly-worded statutes like the Sherman 
Act.274 But when Congress has enacted a detailed statute that does not appear to 
grant courts lawmaking authority, it makes sense for courts to seek congressional 
input before engaging in law-making.  If an agent receives detailed directions 
from its principal, but some portions of those directions are less than clear, it is 
reasonable to think that the agent should first seek clarification before attempting 
to guess at, or manufacture, the missing pieces.  Only when the principal refuses 
to clarify is the agent truly free to improvise. 
 
272 The Sherman Act has been described as “deliberately committing to the courts the 
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As a pragmatic matter, a nonresponse to a judicial referral also provides the 
courts with political cover to engage in more freewheeling and creative statutory 
interpretation.  Critics will find it less easy to criticize courts for “activist” 
interpretations of statutes if the courts have first sought legislative clarification of 
ambiguous statutory text.  Although courts dealing with statutory ambiguity 
might be fairly described as “legislating from the bench,” it is clear that they are 
doing so out of necessity, and not because they are seeking to arrogate legislative 
power.  Courts will never, of course, be free from criticism by those who dislike 
their rulings, but judicial efforts to seek answers from the political branches 
would blunt attempts to claim that judges are usurping the legislative role. 
 Imagine that in 2004 the Supreme Court had asked Congress to clarify Title 
IX, the False Claims Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act to resolve the 
questions at issue in Jackson, Graham County and Clark. And imagine that 
Congress had not responded and the Court had gone ahead and decided those 
cases just as it did.  Would commentators have been as free with their criticism?  
Possibly.  But the Court would have had the added legitimacy that comes with an 
attempt to defer to another branch of government that is unwilling, or unable, to 
fulfill its assigned constitutional role.  And the opinions themselves would have 
made less of an effort to pretend to “construe” inscrutable statutes, and would 
have been more forthright in describing what the Court was actually doing – 
supplying law where Congress had failed to do so. 
4. Undermining Legislative Coherence and Consistency. 
 Judges are valued for their role as guardian of the law’s continuity and 
coherence.  Judges integrate statutes into the greater fabric of the law and 
stabilize statutory meaning through binding precedent and the doctrine of stare 
decisis.275 A practice of certifying questions to Congress might undermine these 
judicial attributes by giving Congress greater opportunity to alter statutory 
meaning or, should Congress fail to respond when courts certify questions, by 
permitting courts to engage in creative law-making that undermines the laws’ 
consistency and coherence.  Dynamic theories of statutory interpretation have 
been criticized for interfering with the development of consistent and coherent 
interpretation,276 and a certification process could similarly be criticized for 
disrupting settled expectations about the law. 
 The values of continuity and consistency in statutory interpretation are at 
their least compelling in cases appropriate for certification, however.  Only the 
truly intractable questions of statutory ambiguity should be sent to Congress; that 
is, only the questions for which reference to statutory structure, purpose, and 
history can provide no answer.  In those kinds of cases, courts reach different 
results about statutory meaning and litigants and experts in the field have no clear 
conception of what the law means or how it applies.  Litigants cannot claim to 
have relied on amorphous statutory language for which courts had not adopted a 
consistent interpretation.  Can the defendant school district in Jackson have 
depended on its understanding that Title IX did not encompass claims of 
retaliation when courts had differed on that question for the last ten years?  Can 
the plaintiff in Graham County have counted on a six-year statute of limitations 
in a statute that was far from clear?  Judges should resort to certification only 
when there is no stable, consistent legal interpretation to adhere to, and when 
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appellate courts have failed to build a coherent understanding of how the 
statutory provision at issue can be interpreted so as to be situated within a larger 
body of law.   
 Admittedly, Congress may choose to respond to the certification by 
amending the law in ways that break from the spirit of the original, disrupting 
settled expectations.  But this change in course cannot be criticized as a failure of 
continuity in the same way that one might criticize a court were it to overturn 
precedent and adopt a new interpretation of statutory meaning.  To state the 
obvious, statutes should be construed consistently only if the statutory language 
remains unchanged; once Congress amends a statute, any benefit of consistency 
is immediately outweighed by the value of adhering to currently-expressed 
preferences of the political branches.   
 As explained, Congress would likely remain silent in the face of a certified 
question from a court most of the time, which arguably gives courts greater 
leeway to creatively fill gaps and create statutory meaning.277 This judicial 
lawmaking does not come at the expense of consistency and coherence in 
statutory interpretation, however.  When judges face the task of construing laws 
on which there is no consensus view, by definition they will not disrupt settled 
expectations about the meaning of the law.  Judges engaged in this task should 
have as one of their goals statutory coherence – that is, an interpretation of the 
statutory text that fits within the scheme of statutes and common law rules that 
already exist.  And once a court does pronounce on the meaning of an ambiguous 
statute that Congress has refused to clarify, its word should operate with the same 
finality that courts normally give to their opinions.  So, for example, if an 
appellate court certifies a question to Congress, receives no response, and then 
establishes legislative meaning itself, that decision should be accorded the same 
respect as any other precedent, thus leading to the consistency and coherence in 
statutory interpretation that is generally valued. 
CONCLUSION 
 When courts are faced with truly inscrutable statutes, they currently have no 
choice but to apply the canons of construction and interpretive theories to justify 
reaching a result in the case before them.  As a few judges admit, however, there 
are some cases in which the tools of statutory construction can supply no answer 
to the question at hand.  Permitting courts to certify questions about statutory 
meaning to Congress opens a channel of communication with Congress and 
provides the judiciary with an alternative method of resolving hard cases.  
Certification seems particularly appropriate when it would allow a court to avoid 
deciding difficult constitutional questions or where Congress has left 
significantly policy questions unanswered – questions that Congress, not the 
courts, is better suited to answer.  Moreover, by seeking congressional input, 
courts protect themselves against charges of judicial overreaching that usually 
accompany judicial lawmaking.   
 Although turning to Congress to resolve pending cases appears at first 
glance to require a dangerous blurring of legislative and judicial functions, it 
merely harnesses Congress’s already-existing authority to create new law to 
govern pending cases – a power that Congress has consistently exercised since 
the foundation of our constitutional democracy.  For better or worse, Congress is 
already in the business of amending statutes that affect cases before the courts, 
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and the parties to litigation are already lobbying Congress to change the laws at 
issue in their cases.  Considering that Congress is already assisting the courts by 
clarifying statutory language at issue in pending cases, albeit in an informal and 
ad hoc way – it makes sense to formalize the process and give the judiciary a role 
in determining when congressional input might be of assistance.   
 
